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SUMMARY AND THESIS

A critical issue in desegregation law is how a school district once
found to have been de jure segregated becomes "unitary." This issue
is already of considerable practical importance and will become even
more so as a greater number of school districts begin to move for
recognition of their unitary status. Yet the issue has never been clearly
addressed by the Supreme Court, and has only recently received attention
in the lower courts and law reviews.
This article analyzes the procedures and decisions of the Supreme
Court with respect to the unitary status of previously segregated public
schools in terms of general law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
There seems to be no explicit support for the proposition that desegregation litigation is exempt from the same rules of evidence, civil
procedure, and substantive law as any other litigation. 2 Because the
Supreme Court often does not explain its decisions in terms of those
1. E.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987) (Overton), aff'g
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 671 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Tex. 1987); Morgan v.
Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987) (Nucci), vacating in part and aff'g in part 620 F.
Supp. 214 (D. Mass. 1985), 617 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Mass. 1985); Dowell v. Board of
Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986) (Dowell I), vacating 606
F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (Dowell 1), on remand, 677 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla.
1987) (Dowell III) reversed after remand, No. 88-1067 (10th Cir. July 7, 1989) (Dowell
II) (opin. withdrawn Sept. 15, 1989); Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986) (Riddick), aff'g 627
F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984).
2. Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989) ("a principle of general
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence"); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775, 1792 (1989) ("Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply to Title VII
cases"); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1988) (per curiam);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 191, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1076 (1987); United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1483
(1983); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S. Ct. 1267,
1275 (1971) (Swann); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.6, 99 S.
Ct. 2941, 2946 n.6 (1979) (Columbus); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378, 96 S. Ct.
598, 607 (1976); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.ll, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1545 n.ll
(1976); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399, 102 S. Ct.
3141, 3154 (1982); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 531.
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general rules, however, the lower courts are developing separate and
special rules for civil rights litigation in general and school desegregation
cases in particular. This development reverses the movement away from
special procedural rules for each "cause of action" that has characterized
the development of the common law during the Nineteenth and Twentieth
centuries. Moreover, this tendency runs counter to the explicit and
unqualified mandates of federal statutory law expressed in part at least
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For this reason, analysis in
terms of the common rules of law is not only logically correct, but also
legally more appropriate.
The theory of desegregation advanced herein is that once a court
finds liability-that is, an intentionally segregated school system-that
court must issue a remedial order which it predicts will eradicate and
completely correct the prior constitutional violations. All vestiges of
segregation must be identified and eradicated. (§§ 2-3). The court order
must be tailored to remedy the violation found, and when finally approved, constitutes res judicata with respect to the remedial sufficiency
of every part of the remedy. (§§ 4-5). Such a desegregation order may
only be modified as a final judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (§§ 6-7). Once the order has been fully
implemented and fully complied with, either in its original form or as
modified, then the constitutional violations previously found must be
deemed to have been corrected and the system adjudged fully unitary.
Rule 60(b) then requires that the judgment be vacated as satisfied. (§
8). Under certain circumstances, even where the desegregation order is
not completely or perfectly implemented, unitary status should be recognized. (§§ 9-10). The achievement of unitary status has three results.
First, the injunctions should be vacated. New violations may be proved
in this and any other litigation only by showing an intent to discriminate
by the defendants. Second, under ordinary circumstances, the case should
be terminated. Termination should be delayed only where supplemental
claims of subsequent intentional discrimination are made. (§§ 11-13).
Finally, the finding of unitary status is accorded the same effect as any
other necessary finding for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, thus precluding anyone in privity with the parties from thereafter
relitigating either liability or remedy for the prior segregated system. (§
14).
The critical point in the above legal analysis is that res judicata
applies to the desegregation decree. Logically and necessarily flowing
from this conclusion3 is the the preclusion of a continuing and flexible

3. In this respect, this analysis opposes that of Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1986)
[hereinafter Jost] and Landsberg, The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression
Plan, 48 La. L. Rev. 789 (1988) [hereinafter Landsberg].
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modification of the decree, the operation of the "satisfaction" clause
of Rule 60(b), and the holding in Board of Education of Pasadena City
Schools v. Spangler.4 From this conclusion, the corollary that the finding
of unitary status likewise is res judicata is a logical result. If res judicata
did not apply, the desegregation decree could be modified at will, and
rendered incapable of satisfaction. Hence, the dicta of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,' and the holding of Spangler I
would be incompatible with the fabric of the law.'
In this article, the desegregation decisions of the Supreme Court are
accepted as an accurate and consistent articulation of the law of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
7
United States. No criticism of these various holdings will be made.
Theories of desegregation and constitutional analyses that are based
upon a disagreement with these holdings are not addressed in this paper,
except to the extent that they raise points relevant to its analysis. Not
only are the doctrines articulated in these cases implicit in Swann, the
last unanimous decision by the Court on desegregation,' but the decisions
and the doctrines they expound also provide essential and highly persuasive support for the thesis advanced herein.
2.

GOAL OF. UNITARINESS

The ultimate goal of a court ordered desegregation plan is the
creation of a ,unitary school district. Thus, the formulation of the
4. 427 U.S. 424, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976) (Spangler 1). See also 549 F.2d 733 (9th
Cir. 1977) (remanding to district court); 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (on appeal after
remand) (Spangler 11); see also 552 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971) (Swann).
6. This approach was propounded by the Pre-Trial Memorandum of the United
States as amicus curiae filed on a Motion for Declaration of Unitary Status in Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. (Civ. A. No. C-1499, D. Colo.) on Feb. 8, 1984.
7. Accordingly, critical analyses of the holdings that a showing of intentionally
segregative conduct in a significant part of the school district raises a presumption of
intentional segregative conduct throughout the school system, Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, Denver, Colo. 413 U.S. 189, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973) (Keyes), the propriety of busing
and other race-conscious remedies, Swann, and the affirmative duty to desegregate (including an effects test in formulating the remedy), Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) (Dayton I), Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407
U.S. 451, 92 S. Ct. 2196 (1972) (Council of Emporia), are beyond the scope of this
paper. Similarly, the necessity of showing discriminatory intent to prove a violation of
the equal protection clause, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976),
the mandate that the remedy be tailored to the violation, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 744, 91 S. Ct. 3112, 3127 (1974) (Milliken 1), Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977) (Dayton 1), Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 293294, 96 S. Ct. at 1544, and that race-conscious conduct and racial balance are a temporary
remedy, not a permanent goal, Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 28, 91 S. Ct. at 1276, 1283 (1971),
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 88 S. Ct. 1697 (1968) (Raney), will also be
accepted.
8. See Landsberg, supra note 3, at 804-805.
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desegregation plan that will be adopted as a final order and judgment
requires a working definition of what constitutes a unitary school district. 9 Swann gives a basic description of this goal: "Our objective in
dealing with the issues presented by these cases is to see that school
authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly
or indirectly, on account of race."' 0 The elements of a unitary school
system are described consistently with the Swann decision in 20 U.S.C.
1707:
When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a
school system is desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional
requirements, or that it is a unitary system, or that it has no
vestiges of a dual system, and thereafter residential shifts in
population occur which result in school population changes in
any school within such a desegregated school system, such school
population changes so occurring shall not, per se, constitute a
cause for civil action for a new plan of desegregation or for
modification of the court approved plan. 1

9. The precise definition of an unitary school system has for some time curiously
evaded the grasp of the Supreme Court. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232,
237, 90 S. Ct. 891, 893 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See Graglia, When Honesty
Is "Simply... Impractical" for the Supreme Court: How The Constitution Came to Require
Busing for School Racial Balance, (Book Review) 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1153, 1174-1176
(1987). See also Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction, at 14 (1978) ("a doctrinal uncertainty
(a lack of clarity as to what 'unitary nonracial school system' meant.")); Gewirtz, Choice
in Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728,
732-733 (1986) [hereinafter Gewirtz, Choice]; Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary
Schools, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 41, 57-59 (1986); Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof
After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
653, 662 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Allocating the Burden]. Indeed, as two courts have
stated, "[Tihe [Supreme] Court has produced no formula for recognizing a unitary school
system," Overton, 834 F.2d at 1177 (quoting Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318). See also Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 602-603 (1983) ("evasion may sometimes be
functional") [hereinafter Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance]. However imprecise the Court's
discussion may have been, the Court in each instance regards the term as describing a
condition of a school district having highly significant legal consequences. Contra Dowell
IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 21; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 812-813, 815-816.
10. 402 U.S. at 23, 91 S.Ct. at 1297. Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has
stated that "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at
once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S.Ct. 29, 29 (1969) (Alexander). The court
has further equated "unitariness" with a "nonracial system of public education," Green
v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 436, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1693 (1968)
(Green), "racial neutrality," Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S.Ct. at 2704; and "racially
nondiscriminatory school system," Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458, 99 S.Ct. at 2947.
11. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 208, 88
Stat. 516. This provision was originated as a floor amendment in 1972 by Rep. Fascell
(D. Fla.), 118 Cong. Rec. 28886 (1972). A variant of section 1707, section 1714(c), was
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The statute refers to "such a desegregated school system" as one which

has been determined to meet one of four specified conditions. These
statutory conditions are different ways of describing that status which
the Supreme Court was to characterize two years later in Spangler I as
a unitary school system.

A final desegregation order contains findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and remedies. The findings and conclusions identify the intentionally discriminatory conduct causing segregation that has been found
3
to exist by the court 12 and identify any vestiges of this prior segregation.
4

If the violation was systemic, then the remedy must be systemic.
The desegregation plan should entirely dismantle the dual school
system and engender (when the plan is fully implemented) a unitary

school system.' 5 It must prohibit future discrimination

6

as well as elim-

also offered as a floor amendment by Rep. Fascell. Section 1714(c) states:
When a court of competent jurisdiction determines that a school system is
desegregated, or that it meets the constitutional requirements, or that it is a
unitary system, or that it has no vestiges of a dual system, and thereafter
residential shifts in population occur which result in school population changes
in any school within such a desegregated school system, no educational agency
because of such shifts shall be required by any court, department, or agency
of the United States to formulate, or implement any new desegregation plan,
or modify or implement any modification of the court approved desegregation
plan, which would require transportation of students to compensate wholly or
in part for such shifts in school population so occurring.
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 215, 88 Stat. 517.
12. The finding of discrimination is one of fact. Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 534 & n.8,
99 S. Ct. 2971 & n.8; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3278 (1982).
See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1291 n.6 (1980) (first
amendment constitutional violation); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 99 S. Ct. 693 (1979) (same).
13. The courts appear to distinguish between the intentional segregation and the
vestiges of this segregation. For the limited purposes of this article, the terms "vestiges"
of segregation and "effects" of segregation will be considered synonymous. The proper
definition of vestiges of segregation, nevertheless, is beyond the scope of this article. See
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 819; Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1983); Note, Retention of Jurisdiction in Desegregation Cases: A
Causal and Attitudinal Analysis, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 195, 225 (1978); Note, Unitary School
Systems and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 794
(1987) [hereinafter Williams]; Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't
Anybody Laughing? (Book Review), 95 Yale L.J. 1737 (1986). However defined, the
desegregation plan must eliminate, correct, and remedy all such vestiges.
14. Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213, 93 S.
Ct. at 2700.
15. For the purposes of this article, any distinction between a final desegregation
order, a final desegregation decree, and a final desegregation judgment are deemed ir-
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inate the 'vestiges of past intentional segregation. It may not hide these

effects, neutralize them, or place them in a dormant condition. It must

"so far as possible eliminate" them.' 7 Whether the remedial plan is
proposed by the defendants, by the plaintiffs, by an independent consultant, or by the court sua sponte, s the obligation of the court in

approving such a desegregation plan is to assure that the plan "promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." 19 It must
make every effort accurately to predict the future and "attempt to bring
all of the future into the present and deal with it as though it were

present.' '20
When initially fashioning a desegregation remedy, in order to gauge
2
whether the plan will be "effective" in dismantling the dual system, '

relevant and the three terms will be used synonymously. See infra text accompanying
notes 176-82 for the distinction between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions.
16. "In devising remedies .. . it is the responsibility of . . . district courts to see to
it that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to
perpetuate or re-establish the dual system." Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S. Ct. at 1279.
See also Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 460, 99
S. Ct. at 2948.
17. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822 (1965) ("[T]he
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination
in the future"); Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 417, 97 S.Ct. at 2774; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200
& n.1l, 93 S. Ct. at 2693 & n.ll; Swann, 402 U.S. at 15, 91 S.Ct. at 1275; Green,
391 U.S. at 437, 88 S. Ct. at 1693; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at
589. Landsberg argues that a desegregation plan may in fact only "neutralize [ ] those
effects [of past discrimination] for so long as [the plan] was in place." Landsberg, supra
note 3, at 818. Williams similarly suggests that "surface" vestiges are remedied, but that
other vestiges "underlying," are not remedied but merely counter-acted or hidden by most
plans. Williams, supra note 13, at 799-805. See also id. at 796-799; Landsberg, supra
note 3, at 826. The primary example of such unremedied vestiges is residential segregation,
which a busing plan arguably counteracts but does not cure with respect to the segregation
in neighborhood schools. Williams, supra note 13, at 801-802. However, neither Landsberg
nor Williams appear to argue that a plan that only neutralized or counteracted the vestiges
of prior segregation would be constitutionally adequate, and should therefore be approved
by the courts. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 824. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
at 154, 85 S.Ct. at 822; Fiss, supra note 9, at 10.
18. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 810.
19. Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694 (emphasis original). See Swann, 402
U.S. at 13, 91 S.Ct. at 1275.
20. Jost, supra note 3, at 1103 n.20. The district court must retain jurisdiction over
a desegregation action until unitary status is achieved. Raney, 391 U.S. at 449, 88 S.Ct.
at 1700 ("[T]he better course would be to retain jurisdiction until it is clear that disestablishment has been achieved."); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280, 97 S.Ct. 2749,
2757 (1977) (Milliken II); Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1695; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-301, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756 (1955) (Brown I); see Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 598.
21. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S.Ct. at 1280. Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile
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courts must consider the extent to which the proposed remedial plan
will leave in place predominantly one-race schools or other substantial
racial imbalances caused by prior segregation. It is a rebuttable presumption that all such one-race schools are a product of intentional
discrimination.22 This is not a legal fiction,23 but an evidentiary rule
based on logic, probability, and painful experience. 24 Nevertheless, the
decisions in both Swann and Spangler I provide that there is no right
2
to a particular racial balance in any school.
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure further requires
that injunctions shall state their terms specifically and in reasonable
detail. This rule must, of course, apply to desegregation orders as it
would to any injunction. 26 Possibly most important, however, and consistent with the commands of both equity and Rule 65(d), the remedy
27
must be specifically tailored to the findings of constitutional violation.

County, 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S. Ct. 1289, 1292 (1971); Raney, 391 U.S. at 448, 88 S.
Ct. at 1699.
22. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S. Ct. at 1280; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 809.
23. Contra Landsberg, supra note 3, at 809.
24. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S. Ct. at 2697 ("[Tlhere is a high probability that
where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful
portion of the school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their
actions in other areas of the system."), 209 ("This burden shifting principle . . . 'is merely
a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations."') (quoting
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940); Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S. Ct.
at 1280. See Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights,
19 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 310, 324 (1984) [hereinafter Days,
Turning Back].
25. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S. Ct. at 1280 (disapproving a "substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing"); Spangler 1, 427 U.S.
at 434, 96 S. Ct. at 2703.
26. Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 438, 96 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)).
"Every order granting an injunction ... shall be specific in terms, [and] shall describe
in reasonable detail, . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained.") (emphasis added). See
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64,
75, 88 S. Ct. 201, 207 (1967). See also Fiss, supra note 9, at 13.
27. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 279, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847,
1849 (1986) (plurality) (Wygant); id. at 284-285 (O'Connor, J., concurring); General
Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3154
(1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2776 (1980) ("[alny
congressional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective
of remedying the present effects of past discrimination [must be] tailored to the achievement
of that goal") (Burger, C.J.); Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-294, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 376-381, 96 S. Ct. 598, 606 (1978); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 738, 744, 746, 94
S. Ct. at 3124, 3127, 3128; id. at 757, 94 S. Ct. at 3133 (Stewart, J., concurring); Swann,
402 U.S. at 16, 91 S. Ct. at 1276; System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,
81 S. Ct. 368 (1961) (System Federation No. 91). See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586 n.9 (1984) (Stotts); Fiss, The
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Professor Fiss characterizes the "tailoring" concept of "the relationship
between remedy and violation [as being] deductive or formal." His
position is that "certain features of the tailoring principle," i.e., "the
insistence that the remedy must fit the violation," suggest that "the
violation [serves] as the premise and the remedy the conclusion." Thus,
"the violation is viewed as the exclusive source of the remedy; and ...
the remedy, like the conclusion, is thought to follow from the violation"
with a high degree of certainty. 21 Under the tailoring concept, a remedy
29
sufficient to correct the violation is a matter of right, not discretion.
Several legal scholars oppose the tailoring concept. Among them,
Professor Fiss argues that "we must free ourselves" from the tailoring
concept.3 0 Professor Chayes concurs with this view, arguing that just as
"there is no way to reason from the 'right' to a desegregated school
system established by Brown to the content of the decree in any particular
is equally impossible to work backward from the relief to
case, [i]t
define the contours of the right." 3 1 Professor Landsberg also decidedly
opposes the tailoring concept:
The Supreme Court, in Brown II, Swann, and [Spangler 1],
sketched out a general approach to the school desegregation
remedy. The remedy is not fully congruent with the violation
and its effects, for district courts have broad discretion to both

Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 46
(1979) (claims that the tailoring principle was "quietly introduced in Swann but first
applied in Milliken L"); Fiss, supra note 9, at 43; Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 683 (1982); Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 589; Jost, supra note 3,at 1122; Landsberg,
supra note 3, at 802; Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard
and Equal Protection Law, 92 Yale L.J. 328, 337 (1982); Note, supra note 13, at 200.
28. Fiss, supra note 27, at 46. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1115; Fiss, supra note 9,
at 55. See also, Chayes, Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1282 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role of Judge]; see generally Chayes, The Supreme
Court 1981 Term, Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Law Litigation]. Professor Fiss, perhaps postulating an easier target, also suggests two additional inherent characteristics of a "tailored"
remedy: "each specific provision of the remedy is explicable in terms of the violation;
[and] it is assumed that there is a unique remedy in the same way there is a single
conclusion to a syllogism." Fiss, supra note 27, at 46.
29. But see Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 590-608 (gap between
right and remedy); Landsberg, supra note 3, at 824.
30. Fiss, supra note 27, at 46-47.
31. Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 28, at 50. Professor Chayes admits
that "the Burger Court['s] ... decisions have been something less than hospitable to the
procedures and elements of public law litigation." Id. at 7-8. See Fiss, supra note 27,
at 4-5. See also Chayes, Role of Judge, supra note 28, at 1293-1296, 1296, 1298-1302;
Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 Yale L.J. 1700, 17171720 (1986). Cf. Note, supra note 13, at 231-234.
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use racial balance as a starting point and to take into account
32
the practicalities of the situation.
Professor Landsberg thus follows the "structural injunction" model
propounded by Professors Fiss and Chayes.33 This view of desegregation
remedies precludes the use of the doctrine of res judicata for injunctions
because it posits that no issues have yet been-or ever will be-determined.
The preceding view of the amorphous connection between violations
found and remedies required contradicts almost every decision written
by the Court touching on desegregation remedies. Swann, Spangler I,
Dayton I, Milliken I, and Dayton II all require that remedies must be
narrowly tailored to violations. Even Professor Chayes admits that "the
Burger Court may be seen to be embarked on some such program for
the restoration of the traditional forms of adjudication. 3 4 On the other
hand, such an amorphous connection advances the power of the judiciary's discretion as the prime agent of assumedly beneficent change. a5
3.

FORMULATION OF REMEDIAL

ORDERS

Once the trial court has determined what a perfectly unitary school
district would be, it must fashion a remedy that will achieve that
condition. In approving a desegregation plan, however, the court must
36
conduct an equitable balancing of interests.
The defendant school boards, having violated the plaintiff's rights,
must redress those violations. This is the obligation articulated in Council
of Emporia and Dayton H.37 This duty of the defendants to desegregate
is absolute. Nevertheless, because school desegregation cases almost
always seek equitable relief, school boards have some leeway and the
district court has the equitable authority to balance various governmental
interests, generally, the advancement of educational goals weighed against
39
the duty to integrate.

32.

Landsberg, supra note 3, at 836-837.

33.

See generally, Fiss, supra note 9; Chayes,

Role of Judge, supra note 28; see

Jost, supra note 3, at 1118 n.105, 1144-1146 & n.254.
34. Chayes, Role of Judge, supra note 28, at 1304. See also Chayes' discussion of
Rizzo v. Goode, id. at 1305-1307; Note, supra note 27, at 336.
35. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1143 and cases at 1118 n.105. But see generally Hayek,
Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1960), at 133-339.
36. Chayes, Role of Judge, supra note 28, at 1292-1293. Jost, supra note 3, at 1126
n.157.

37.
U.S. at
38.
538, 99
39.

Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 460, 462, 92 S. Ct. 2196, 2202; Dayton 11, 443
537-540, 99 S. Ct. at 2978.
Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-459, 99 S. Ct. at 2946; Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 537S. Ct. at 2978.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300, 75 S. Ct. at 756 ("Traditionally, equity has been
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The desegregation plan need not be the plan that is most desegregative. It may take into account other factors such as funding and
transportation.4 The preclusion or reduction of "white flight," however,
is not a legitimate governmental objective, 41 although plans that are
designed in part to attract non-black students into schools on a voluntary
basis are appropriate so long as the plan as a whole furthers desegregation.

42

In this balancing process, factors must be taken into account that
are not properly connected to the establishment of a unitary school
system. 4 3 As the Court stated in Council of Emporia, "the weighing of
these factors to determine their effect upon the process of desegregation
is a delicate task,""4 citing Brown 11:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these
4
cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.
There will be some elements of the unitary school system which can be
achieved only at so great a cost to educational goals that the court,46
applying the traditional rules of equity and properly balancing interests,
will not attempt to achieve them. Where a remedy does more harm

characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional
attributes of equity power .... To that end, the courts may consider problems related
to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school
transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis."); see also Milliken H, 433 U.S. at 280 n.15, 97 S. Ct. at 2757 n.15;
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 467, 92 S. Ct. at 2205; Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31, 91
S. Ct. at 1283.
40. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300, 75 S. Ct. at 756.
41. United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 490-491, 92 S.Ct.
2214, 2217 (1972). Generally, the courts cannot allow themselves to accommodate local
prejudices. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
42. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 528-529, 540; Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 99 (5th Cir.
1983).
43. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 598-608. See Jost, supra note
3,at 1126 n.157.
44. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 466, 92 S. Ct. at 2205.
45. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299, 75 S. Ct. at 756.
46. Id.at 300, 75 S. Ct. at 756.
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than good, for instance where its cost, economic or otherwise, is greater
than its benefit, equity will not command that remedy. 47 For example,
busing may not be used as a remedy to the extent that it is incompatible

with the health or safety of the students. 4 Even continuing judicial
supervision is not cost-free. it can be expensive and time consuming.
Moreover, it denies local self-government in an area particularly appro-

priate for local decisionmaking. 49 In this respect, Congress has enacted
legislation that attempts to subordinate the use of busing as an element
in a unitary school system to other educational goals. 0
In addition to the above balancing process, the trial court must
decide whether there are vestiges of segregation that judicial supervision

cannot cure. Some elements of the ideal unitary school district cannot
be achieved through judicial or other governmental action. A court may
well be unable to correct all effects through a decree, even continuing
disproportionate effects. As the Court in Swann noted,
elimination of racial discrimination in the public schools is a
large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to
achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school

authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of
baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown
I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond
their scope."'

Even one race schools may be untouched because of "the practicalities
of the situation."3' 2 This assessment regarding the ability of the courts
"to accomplish their expansive goals," however, should not be confused

with the "definition of 'unitar[iness]. ' ' 3
The unrealizable elements of a unitary school system may be closely
related to the competing interests just discussed. Depending upon one's

47. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, 598-608.
48. Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31, 91 S. Ct. at 1283; Days, supra note 24, at 320;
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 803.
49. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 741-742, 94 S. Ct. at 3112, 3125 ("No single tradition
in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process");
Williams, supra note 13, at 804; Terez, supra note 9, at 54 n.60.
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1714(b) (1982). See Days, supra note 24, at 230.
51. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22, 91 S. Ct. at 1279. Contrary to Landsberg, supra note
3, at 819 n.149, this limitation is not confined to the use of busing, but extends to all
remedial measures in a school desegregation case.
52. Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S. Ct.
1289, 1292 (1971). See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203, 93 S. Ct. at 2695; Gewirtz, Remedies
and Resistance, supra note 9, at 596.
53. Williams, supra note 13, at 805; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note
9, at 591-593, 668.
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view of the efficacy of judicial and governmental action, one may
determine that the court cannot stop white flight, or that the necessary
judicial or governmental control of individual decisions necessary to stop
white flight is outweighed by other considerations. For example, a court

order enjoining people from moving their residences or from sending
their children to private schools would involve a balancing of interests
in which the unitariness is outweighed by another
governmental goal,
54
namely, the preservation of individual freedom.
Legal damages, where not within the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment or the statute of limitations, are available to fill the gaps left by
equity's limitations."
4.
A.

REs

JUDICATA

General Principle

Once the final desegregation order is formulated and approved, it
has the effect of a final judgment under the doctrine of res judicata.56
The doctrine of res judicata 7 teaches that "when a court of competent
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of
action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound 'not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or

54. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 646
F.2d 925, 944 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939, 102 S.Ct. 1430
(1982). See also Williams, supra note 13, at 804; Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 9, at 734
n.17; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 603 & n.43; Note, Institutional
Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 Yale L.J. 1474, 1479 n.23,
1491 n.84 (1982).
55. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at 606 n.50; but see id. at 598
n.29.
56. The application of res judicata arises twice in desegregation litigation: First, it
applies to the final desegregation order, discussed here. Second, it applies to the determination of unitary status, discussed at §§ 8 and 14. The elements and prerequisites for
the application of res judicata discussed here equally govern the determination of unitary
status.
57. As noted by the Supreme Court, the First Restatement of Judgments uses the
term res judicata broadly to cover the functions and effects of merger, bar, collateral
estoppel, and direct estoppel. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326
n.6, 75 S.Ct. 865, 867 n.6 (1955); Restatement (First) of Judgments, Chapter 3, Introductory Note, at 160 (1942). The Second Restatement retains this definition of res judicata
but combines the doctrines of collateral estoppel and direct estoppel within the term of
"issue preclusion." United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 568,
571 n.3 (1984). The operational effect here given to res judicata is attributed by the
Second Restatement to "merger" and "bar", and are sometimes referred to as "claim
preclusion." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Chapter 3, Introductory Note, at 131
(1980).
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defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose."' 5 8 Res judicata is not a
technical rule, but a fundamental rule of repose for both society and
litigants. "[The] doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice
or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a
rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of
private peace,' which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the
courts." 9 This language, used by the Supreme Court half a century
6
ago, is even more compelling in view of today's crowded dockets. 0
The doctrine of res judicata applies to injunctions. 61 This doctrine
is consistent with, if not required by, the merger of law and equity
accomplished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62 The doctrine
of res judicata governs litigation brought under Section 1983, the statute
under which almost all desegregation suits are authorized. 63 The effect

58. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715,
719 (1948) (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877)). See Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2430 (1981) (Moitie)
(Blackmun, J.,concurring in the judgment); Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 432, 96 S.Ct. at
2703; IB J.Moore, J.Lucas & J. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 0.405[l], at 178
(2d ed. 1988). Cf. Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 441 n.21
(1986). Thus, claims that residential imbalances and educational deficiencies are the result
and vestige of school segregation must be advanced as part of the original desegregation
suit. The failure of the court to consider or (where proven) remedy these claims is error.
See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S. Ct. at 278. However, for the purpose of res
judicata, the judgment need not be free from error. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398, 101 S.Ct.
at 2427; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117, 52 S.Ct. 460, 463 (1932)
(Swift); IB Moore's Federal Practice 0.405[4.-1], at 197 n.3. See generally, IB Moore's
Federal Practice 0.405, at 178.
59. Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S.Ct. 506, 508
(1917).
60. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 401, 101 S.Ct. at 2429. This is accepted even though "[the
defense of res judicata is universally respected, but actually not very well liked." Riordon
v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945). The principles of res judicata retain their
persuasive and precedential strength in recent decisions. See Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
101 S.Ct. 411 (1980).
61. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,-37, 71 S. Ct. 104, 105
(1950) (prior injunction suit res judicata as to subsequent treble damage action); Sibbald
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838). Cf. System Federation No. 91, 364
U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368; Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464; Dowell II, 795 F.2d
at 1522; 27 A.J.2d, Equity § 245, at 811 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
18 comments b and c (1980); IB Moore's Federal Practice
0.40511] at 182 n.17. Cf.
18 U.S.C. 1509 (1982), discussed at Fiss, supra note 9, at 17. But see Restatement of
Judgments § 46 comment a (1942); id. § 47 comment h.
62. Cf. 11 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, §
2863, at 205 (1981).
63. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-97, 101 S. Ct. 410, 415 (1980); Dowell II,
795 F.2d at 1519, 1522; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 531; Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los
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of res judicata extends to the findings of liability, the necessity of the
remedy, the balancing of equitable interests, and the ultimate sufficiency
of the decree to correct the violations. This is so because all of these
issues are necessary parts of the decision whether to issue the injunction.
A consent judgment has the effect of res judicata in that civil
65
action,64 although its collateral estoppel effect is substantially limited.
Where a court actually makes findings on the merits, however, it is not
a settlement but an order on the merits, even though the parties may
have agreed to the form of the order. 66 Thus, where the element of
"consent" is addressed to the form of remedy, and both the liability
and substance of the remedy were the result of litigation, then the
67
judgment has full res judicata operation.
B.

Objections

Professor Jost asserts that "[rles judicata is not applied to injunctions as it is to legal judgments, because of the prospective nature of
injunctions. ' 68 He cites only two law review articles as explicit authority. 69 One of these articles, an unsigned 1965 student survey in the
Harvard Law Review, disapproved of the doctrine's admitted applicability to injunctions:
In succeeding centuries, as equity courts became imbued with
the legal doctrine of res judicata, they became more reluctant
to grant modification and soon limited their re-examination to
cases of plain error and "new matter." Several American courts
applied the principles of res judicata even more vigorously,
denying modification after the term of court in which the injunction had issued. Although some measure of finality is desirable, the legal doctrine of res judicata is inappropriate when
applied to the injunction remedy. Unlike actions at law, which

Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919, 106
S. Ct. 248 (1985) (Los Angeles Branch); Bronson v. Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist.,
687 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982); 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975) (Bronson).
64. United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 73 S. Ct. 807 (1953);
IB Moore's Federal Practice
0.409[5] at 331-334. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530.
65. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. at 505-506; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530. See
generally IB Moore's Federal Practice
0.444[3].
66. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. at 506, 73 S. Ct. at 809; Riddick, 784 F.2d
at 530.
67. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530.
68. Jost, supra note 3, at 1124.
69. Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78 W. Va. L.
Rev. 155, 163 (1976) ("But because injunctions guide conduct in a changing future, some
observers think res judicata inapposite for injunctions." (footnote omitted)); Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (1965).
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are decided on the law in force at a given moment, an injunction
has a continuing effect and should be adjusted to reflect changes
in the statutory or common law rights of the parties.70
The Supreme Court does not share these sentiments, holding that "[t]here
is simply no 'principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection
by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata' . . . . This

Court has long recognized that '[plublic policy dictates that there be an
end to litigation.""' Ironically, Professor Jost provides substantial support-based on "policy" rather than legal precedent-for treating in72
junctions as if res judicata did apply.
The main thrust of Professor Jost's objection is that the possibility
that "[t]here is no one remedial solution, but rather a range of pos7

sibilities that the court might employ to bring about institutional change,"

should affect the binding nature of the decree because the constitutional
violation conceivably could have been corrected by other means. This
objection does not question the court's finding that some remedy was
required, that the particular remedy approved was sufficient, or that a
decision based on judicial discretion is nonetheless a final decision once
made. Once a school system has been found to be segregated, the remedy
must systematically address all aspects of the violation.7 4 Consequently,

all aspects of a dual system attributable to defendants must be deemed
to have been remedied by a desegregation plan finally approved by the
court as constitutionally adequate.
5.

FINALITY OF DESEGREGATION ORDERS

The doctrine of res judicata applies only where a final judgment
adjudicating the rights of the parties has been entered." A judgment is

70. Note, supra note 69, at 1080-1081 (citations omitted). Modification of injunctions
under showings of changed circumstances are authorized under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5),
and are not inconsistent with res judicata. See infra text accompanying notes 94-160.
71. Moiie, 452 U.S. at 402, 101 S. Ct. at 2429; Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726,
733, 66 S. Ct. 853, 856 (1946).
72. Jost, supra note 3, at 1124-1129, citing (at 1125 n.151) Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 444-445
(1973).
73. Jost, supra note 3, at 1119 (footnote omitted).
74. Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213, 93 S.
Ct. at 2699.
75. United States v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186,
198-199, 70 S. Ct. 537, 544 (1950); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S.
793, 800-801, 69 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1949); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield and Ogilvie,
241 U.S. 22, 28, 36 S. Ct. 477, 480 (1916); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 531; 18 Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4432, at 298; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 620 (1947); Restatement (First) of
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final for the purposes of res judicata and its corollaries when the court
of all of the parties. 76
order adjudicates all of the rights and liabilities
7
An injunction is such a final adjudication.1
Nevertheless, there appears to be some contention that desegregation
decrees are generally not final, even though Spangler I implicitly suggested that they are.7" There are, of course, certain desegregation plans
that are not in fact final.
A.

Three Species of Non-Final Desegregation Orders

One kind of order specifically mentioned in Spangler I as not being
final was the "step at a time" type of order that was relatively popular
during the late 1960's. 79 Under these orders, a school district was desegregated gradually, addressing different aspects of the dual system at
different times and at different speeds.8" Thus, the implementation of
one of these steps was not necessarily grounds for satisfaction of the
judgment. This type of order generally has not been entered since Green.
A second kind of order specifically excluded by Spangler I is a plan
embodying specific revisions of the attendance zones for particular schools,

Judgments § 41 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1980).
Where the judgment is not final, but determinations on issues of fact and law have
been made, the doctrine of "law of the case" substantially inhibits the reconsideration
of those subjects. EEOC v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n. 623 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 1997 (1981); Bromley v. Crisp. 561 F.2d
1351, 1363 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 1458 (1978); White v.
Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-432 (5th Cir. 1967). See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 330
0.404, at 117.
(1st Cir. 1987). See generally IB Moore's Federal Practice,
0.40911.-I] at 301-303.
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 1B Moore's Federal Practice
77. Cf. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464; Jost, supra note 3, at 1105, 1109
n.60, 1112; Note, supra note 69, at 1072, 1080-1081. Where both injunctive relief and
money damages are sought, both claims must be adjudicated for the judgment to be final.
Gresham Park Community v. Org. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. 1981); Brush
Electric Co. v. Western Electric Co., 76 F. 761 (7th Cir. 1896). The desegregation order
should be entered separately as a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. But cf. Bankers
Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S. Ct. 1117 (1978).
All desegregation orders are subject to appeal whether as final orders or as interlocutory
orders with respect to injunctions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1) (1982). Therefore, the
appealability per se of an order offers no criteria for determining the order's finality for
purposes of res judicata. United States v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co.,
339 U.S. 186, 198-199, 70 S. Ct. 537, 544 (1950). But cf. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 531.
78. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704.
79. Id. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704. Professor Gewirtz suggests that "[i]n this sense
all desegregation plans are 'step at a time' plans by definition incomplete at inception."
Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 9, at 795, n.216; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra
note 9,at 590-591.
80. See United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 229-231, 89 S.
Ct. 1670, 1672 (1969). See also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450,
453, 88 S. Ct. 1700, 1702 (1968) (plan immediately effective in elementary schools and
extended over a four year period to junior and senior high schools).
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rather than applying in general terms to all of the district's schools,
and further containing provisions for later appraisal of whether such
discrete individual modifications had achieved the "unitary" system
required by Brown 11.81 Such a plan has been rare since Keyes because
the presumption of systematic segregation announced in that case82 begets
a systematic rather than an individual school remedy.
A third kind of order that is not final is one in which a final
desegregation order is entered but, on appeal, the higher court directs
the district court on remand to reassess its decision on the basis of
subsequent events. Such a desegregation plan had never become final
for res judicata purposes in the first place because it was appealed and
the appellate court found its "promise to work" essentially unrealistic.83
The reassessment then focuses on whether subsequent events have made
84
the original plan's promise to create a unitary system more realistic.
B.

Finality and Modifiability

On the other hand, a court's unquestioned equitable authority to
modify outstanding injunctive decrees" does not render the judgment
less than final.8 6 An explicit provision in desegregation decrees acknowledging the court's power to modify its decrees pursuant to Rule 60(b)
simply reflects the Supreme Court's admonition that jurisdiction should
be retained to oversee implementation of the remedial plan.87 As noted
by the Fourth Circuit in Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk,88 such
"language is not dissimilar to the language in Rule 60(b) which allows

81. Spangler 1,427 U.S. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704. Brown IIrequires a "racially
non-discriminatory school system," 349 U.S. at 301, 75 S.Ct. at 756, in which "admission
to the public schools" is determined "on a nonracial basis." Id. at 300-301.
82. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-211, 93 S. Ct. at 2695.
83. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 1694 (1969). Cf. United States
Smelting, 339 U.S. at 198, 70 S. Ct. at 544 (Res judicata "is not applicable here because
when the case was first remanded, nothing was finally decided.")
84. Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 1694.
85. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S. Ct. at 462. See System Federation No. 91, 364
U.S. at 646, 81 S. Ct. at 370; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
86. System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 647-648, 81 S. Ct. at 371 ("Firmness
and stability must no doubt be attributed to continuing injunctive relief based on adjudicated facts and law, and neither the plaintiff nor the court should be subjected to the
unnecessary burden of re-establishing what has once been decided .... A balance must
thus be struck between the policies of res judicata and the right of the court to apply
modified measures to changed circumstances."); Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464.
87. Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449, 88 S. Ct. 1697, 1700 (1968); Brown
II,349 U.S. at 301, 75 S.Ct. at 756.
88. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
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parties to seek relief from a judgment under certain prescribed circumstances." 9
A district court may not preclude the effects of "finality" by declining to enter a "final" decree and labeling its order as "provisional"
or "interim," or by retaining the power to modify without the showing
required by Rule 60(b).9 The "inherent limitation upon federal judicial
authority" emphasized by the Court in Swann, Spangler I, Milliken I,
and other Supreme Court decisions, 9' cannot be evaded merely by a
court declaring that it retains power to modify its orders from time to
time as it deems circumstances might require. Additionally, such provisions cannot thwart the mandate of Green that the time for deliberate
speed had ended and that orders must "promise realistically to work,
and .. . to work now."' 92 An order that promises realistically to work
"now" necessarily precludes an order that a court deems insufficient
and intends to modify in the future. A plan which the court knows
may require modification is not a plan that honestly and realistically
promises to work-now or at any other time.

6.

MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

The conclusion that a desegregation plan is a final judgment governed
by res judicata does not exempt the plan from the operation of Rule
60(b). As with all equitable decrees, and, for that matter, all judgments
in law 93 or equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plan
94
may be modified pursuant to Rule 60(b).

89,

Id. at 531. The Fourth Circuit in Riddick found the 1975 declaration of unitary

status to be final for res judicata purposes even though the district court had given the

parties the option to reinstate the cause on the docket on a showing of good cause. The
order "concluded a complex legal battle" of several years duration "in which all parties
had ample opportunity to be heard." Id.
90. Id. at 531 (leave to reinstate does not inhibit finality). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
("A Motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation."). Cf. System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 644, 81 S. Ct. at
369. But see, e.g., Keyes v. District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo.
1985).
91. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 91 S. Ct. at 1276 ("As with any equity case, the nature
of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."); id. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 1282
("[A]bsent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering
assignment of students on a racial basis."); Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 434, 96 S. Ct. at
2703; Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744, 94 S. Ct. at 3127. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation,
supra note 28, at 46.
92. Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 1694 (emphasis original). See Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S. Ct. 29, 29 (1969).
93. System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 646, 81 S. Ct. at 370. But see Jost, supra
note 3, at 1109 n.60; id. at 1124 n.148.
94. Jost, supra note 3, at 1105. Cf. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S. Ct. at 462; Note,
supra note 69, at 1080.
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Standard in Swift

Rule 60 allows for modifications only upon certain showings. Most
justifications for proposed desegregation plan modifications do not fall
within the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (4) of Rule 60(b). 9 1 In
the last clause of Rule 60(b)(5) and Rule 60(b)(6)-the "catch-all
clauses" -Congress

codified additional pertinent grounds for modifica-

tion of an otherwise final judgment. 96 Modification is authorized when
further prospective application is inequitable as well as for any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Professor
Moore cautioned, however, that Rule 60(b)(6) "is intended to be a
means for accomplishing justice in exceptional situations; and, so confined, does not violate the principle of finality of judgments."

97

Under the "catch-all clauses," the primary basis for allowing a court
to alter or modify a decree is only seen in the unusual situation where
a showing of "new and unforeseen" changes in law or fact have rendered
the once-valid judgment clearly erroneous or unjust. 9 For example,

modification under these provisions is justified when changes in the
controlling law since the judgment was entered, 99 particularly that governing the scope and nature of remedies,'0 ° indicate that the prior judg-

95. See Note, Clarifying the Desegregation Process, 39 Okla. L. Rev. 519, 523 (1986).
96. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1105 & n.31.
97. 7 Moore's Federal Practice
60.27[2], at 60-274 (emphasis added); Jost, supra
note 3, at 1105; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 828. But cf. Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 614, 69 S. Ct. 384, 390 (1949); cf. also Note, supra note 95, at 522-523.
98. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464. See System Federation No. 91, 364
U.S. at 647, 81 S. Ct. at 371 ("significant changes in law or facts"); Note, supra note
69, at 1080 & n.3, citing Rede v. Rede, Public Record Office Enrolled Chancery Decrees,
c. 78/1, case 44 (1545). United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244,
88 S. Ct. 1496 (1968) (United Shoe), does not suggest a different standard. There, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "in framing the decree, the District Court had 'proceeded
on the premise that relatively mild remedies should be tried as a first resort, and that
the possibility of more drastic measures should be held in abeyance.' Brief of the United
States, No. 394, 1953 Term, 155." Id. at 249, 88 S. Ct. at 1500. The decree at issue in
United Shoe was thus analogous to 'step at a time' [desegregation] plans by definition
incomplete at inception" which Spangler I indicated would require a different standard
of analysis. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704. United Shoe simply held
that plaintiffs seeking modification of such an incomplete remedy need not meet Swift's
inapposite "grievous wrong" standard. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248-249, 88 S. Ct. at
1499. The United Shoe analysis is inapplicable where a desegregation plan, like that
involved in Spangler I, is intended to be a final and complete remedy.
99. See System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 648-650, 81 S. Ct. at 371; see id.
at 650 n.6, 81 S. Ct. at 372 n.6 ("There are many cases in which a mere change in
decisional law has been held to justify modification of an outstanding injunction."); Note,
supra note 69, at 1081-1082.
100. United States v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1007, 99 S. Ct. 622 (1978) ("[Tlhe parties are bound by
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ments in this case were "clearly erroneous" or a "manifest injustice"
to the plaintiffs. Such a change in the law justifies-though it perhaps
does not require-modification because "a remedy should fit the discrete
wrong to which it is addressed ....
[T]he violation is the exclusive

source of the remedy-each provision of an injunction must follow from
the violation and each violation has a unique remedy. Therefore, if the
legal authority grounding an injunction is altered or the factual circumstances that it addressed change in a legally material respect, the injunction must also be modified to conform to the new law or facts." 101
Furthermore, a change in facts may so change the circumstances as
to make it inequitable for the judgment to continue to have prospective
effect. 0 2 A foreseeable change of facts, or a change that was in fact
foreseen, would not authorize the modification because such facts would
have been an aspect of "the circumstances .

.

. obtaining at the time

of [the injunction's] issuance."'0 3
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to persuade the court that
the motion is timely'04 and authorized under Rule 60(b), and that the
judgment, as modified, is tailored to remedy the violation. 05 Further,
the parties may not slumber on their rights even under the "catch-all"
clauses: they must initiate proceedings within a "reasonable time"' and
may not ordinarily wait until a motion under the "satisfaction" clause

intervening opinions" such as Swann.). See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
300 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (Green changed law, requiring plan to be
modified); Note, supra note 13, at 208.
101. Jost, supra note 3, at 1115. See id., at 1132. See also System Federation No.
91, 364 U.S. at 647, 81 S. Ct. at 371 ("[A] sound judicial discretion may call for the
modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law
or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since
arisen ....
[Tlhe court cannot be required to disregard significant changes in law or facts
... ); Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 52 S. Ct. at 462. But see Fiss, supra note 27, at 49.
102. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 592, 104 S. Ct. 2576,
2595 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); System Federation No. 91, 364
U.S. at 642, 81 S. Ct. at 368; Swift, 286 U.S. at 114, 119, 52 S. Ct. at 462, 464; see
Stotts, 467 U.S. at 568, 576, 104 S. Ct. at 2586; Jost, supra note 3, at 1104; IB Moore's
Federal Practice
0.415, at 504. Cf. Swann, 402 U.S. at 7, 91 S. Ct. at 1271; Dowell
II, 795 F.2d at 1522; Note, supra note 79, at 1081-1083.
103. System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 647, 81 S. Ct. at 371 (must be "unexpected"); see Stotts, 467 U.S. at 574, 104 S. Ct. at 2585; id. at 592, 104 S. Ct. at 2595
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Jost, supra note 3, at 1110, 1122, 1135 n.199.
104. Rule 60(b) regulates the time for seeking the modification of a judgment. The
second sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), means not only that the "catch-all" clauses
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), and 60(b)(6), do not include the reasons set forth in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) through (3), but also that, generally, a motion under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(5) or (6), should not be made using any argument that could have been used
to set aside a judgment for mistake, new evidence, or fraud upon the court.
105. See supra note 27.
106. "The motion shall be made within a reasonable time .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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of Rule 60(b)(5) (often a motion for a declaration of unitary status) to
make a counter-motion to modify the judgment.'0 7
This authority to modify its outstanding injunctive decrees "is not
a substitute for an appeal. It does not allow relitigation of issues that
have been resolved by the judgment." 10 As the Supreme Court clearly
stated in United States v. Swift & Co.:' °9 "The injunction, whether right
or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under
the guise of readjusting."'' 10 Thus, an appellate court's power to modify
an injunctive decree does not authorize it to question whether the decree

was valid when entered. As summarized by Justice (then Judge) Blackmun for the Eighth Circuit, "caution, substantial change, unforeseenness,
oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements.""'
B.

Objection: Flexible Standards

A contrary view is taken by the Second Circuit" 2 which suggests
that modification should be allowed "even in the absence of changed
conditions" when "the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing
its purposes,"" 3 as the decree's purposes and propriety are contemporaneously determined." 4 Other courts have granted modification for the
purpose of "effectuat[ing] the rights of the beneficiary," or serving the
"public interest" by protecting third parties or by deferring to other
branches or levels of government." 5 Even less restrictive is the doctrine
allowing modification "to fulfill the promise to the beneficiary of the

107. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1128 & n.167. However, a motion to modify is not
untimely because the defendant in response files a motion for unitary status. United States
v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1223-1225 (5th Cir. 1978).
108. 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, at 206.
109. 286 U.S. 106, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932).
110. Id. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464. See System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 647,
81 S. Ct. at 371.
111. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905, 89 S. Ct. 1745 (1969).
112. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
113. Id. at 35. See United States v. Lawrence County Sch. Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1044
(5th Cir. 1986); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1037-1038 (1986).
114. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1117-1118; Note, supra note 54, at 1477-1478 & n.18.
Cf. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1439 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. Jost, supra note 3, at 1115, 1118-1120. See Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759
(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.)(public interest must be considered and re-balanced on
modification); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1020 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706
F.2d 956, 967-970 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915, 104 S. Ct.
277 (1983); Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-1121 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
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initial decree," based on the "structural public adjudication model"
propounded by Professors Chayes and Fiss." 6 Finally, some commen-

tators now embrace ad hoc balancing explicitly and treat each motion
for modification as though it were sui generis and addressed strictly to
the discretion of the court." 7 Following these doctrines, appellate courts
have allowed modification based on factors other than change in law

or fact, accepting the injunction as a "pliant and instrumental tool for
protecting rights and doing equity.""' This theory, articulated by Judge
McKay in his concurring opinion in Battle v. Anderson," 9 describes a
"process" whose "task is not to declare who is right or who is wrong,
not to calculate the amount of damages or to formulate a decree designed
to stop some discrete act," but ". . . to remove the condition that
threatens the constitutional values.' ' 20 To achieve this goal, "the court
must employ a dynamic and flexible process to refine the remedy continually.""'
These analyses, particularly the doctrine of flexibility "in the public

interest," cannot provide standards that enable courts to make modi-22
fication decisions based on uniform principles rather than expediency.1

These approaches necessarily result in inconsistencies and result-oriented
modifications. Changes in law should be readily discernible,' 23 and changes
in fact are only somewhat less so, 24 but "oppressiveness" and "ineffectiveness," contrary to the view of Professor Jost, 25 are not readily

described, let alone measured. Professor Jost recognized that "as courts
have become more and more flexible in their approach to modification,
the lack of principled standards to guide this flexibility has become

116. Fiss, supra note 27, at 18-28, 44-50; Chayes, Role of Judge, supra note 28, at
1288. See also Fiss, supra note 9, at 86-95; Note, supra note 69, at 1082-1083.
117. Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards for Their Imposition,
Modification, and Dissolution, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 27, 71-73 (1980); Tomlinson, Modification and Dissolution of Administrative Orders and Injunctions, 31 Md. L. Rev. 312,
326 (1971). But see supra note 27 for authorities cited.
118. Jost, supra note 3, at 1105.
119. 708 F.2d 1523, 1536-1540 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014, 104
S. Ct. 1019 (1984) (Sup. Ct. R. 53).
120. 708 F.2d at 1538, quoting Fiss, supra note 27, at 27-28; see id. at 49 (The
particular choice of remedy "must always be open to revision, even without the strong
A revision is justified
showing traditionally required for a modification of a decree ....
if the remedy is not working effectively or is unnecessarily burdensome."); Jost, supra
note 3, at 1118.
121. Jost, supra note 3, at 1118-1119. See id.at 1142-1148.
122. See Jost, supra note 3, at 1106, 1121.
123. System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 643, 81 S. Ct. at 369; Jost, supra note
3, at 1121.
124. See System Federation No. 91, 364 U.S. at 643, 81 S. Ct. at 369.
125. Jost, supra note 3, at 1121.
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increasingly and often painfully obvious.1 12 6 Less euphemistically, this
flexibility has become a convenient substitute for an appeal of the original
order.'27 This substitution cannot be made without ultimately disregarding
the mandate that the remedy must be tailored to the violation.'

2

This approach to modification has been rejected by the Supreme
Court in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,2 9 at least for
civil rights litigation. 30 As analyzed by Professor Jost, 3 , the majority

and both concurring opinions adhere to the notion that modification
can be allowed only to preserve the congruence between the remedy and
the underlying law. Consequently, only a change in facts or a change

in law justify modification. Justice White, writing for the majority, and
Justice O'Connor, concurring, based their opinions strictly upon the
provisions of Title VII, the law on which the original consent decree
was entered. a2 White "adhered to a narrow, tailoring approach to

retmedies in general and to modification in particular" thereby rejecting
arguments for discretion in effectuating the terms of a decree.' 33 Justice
Stevens, concurring, accepted as a matter of general law that the only
justification for modifying a decree was that "respondents had dem-

onstrated the presence of changed circumstances. '' 4 He did not rely
on specific provisions of Title VII, finding as a threshold matter that
changed circumstances were necessary to justify a modification and,
without such a showing of changed circumstances, it was unnecessary

to reach Title VII's provisions.'. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun alone
argued for a flexible approach, emphasizing the need to effectuate the
beneficiary's rights, "the basic purpose of the original consent decree.'

36

126. Jost, supra note 3, at 1106.
127. See Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 1985) (Flaum, J.,dissenting).
128. See Fiss, supra note 27, at 46-50; Jost, supra note 3, at 1116-1120; Chayes, Role
of Judge, supra note 28, at 1299 (In a structural injunction, "the judge will not, as in
the traditional model, be able to derive his responses [the relief] directly from the liability
determination, since, . . . the substantive law will point out only the general direction to
be pursued and a few salient landmarks to be sought out or avoided."); Chayes, Public
Law Litigation, supra note 27, at 46; cf. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 827-830, but see
supra note 12.
129. 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984) (Stotts).
130. See Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 437-438, 96 S.Ct. at 2697 (change in fact or law).
See also Jost, supra note 3, at 1107 & n.46. But see Note, supra note 113, at 1030-1032.
131. Jost, supra note 3,at 1121-1123.
132. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576-577, 104 S. Ct. at 2576; id.at 587-588, 104 S. Ct. at
2590 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
133. Jost, supra note 3, at 1122.
134. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 592, 104 S. Ct. at 2595.
135. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 590-592, 104 S.Ct. at 2594. See Jost, supra note 3,at 11221123.
136. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 611, 104 S.Ct. at 2604; see Jost, supra note 3,at 1123. But
see, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir.)
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MODIFICATION OF DESEGREGATION DECREES

As with any other equitable decree, a desegregation plan may not

produce the expected results. This may occur for a number of reasons.
For example, a school desegregation plan may be based on mistaken
information with respect to the demographics of the school district. It
may be based on information that is thereafter shown-by newly discovered evidence concerning demographics, or other relevant matters,
not available at the trial-to have been incorrect. 37' It may have been
based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse
party. There is no question that a judgment may be modified upon

such a showing.13
Even then, however, there are prerequisites in addition to those

found in Rule 60(b) that must be met before allowing modification of
desegregation plans. First, the court must determine that the plan, as

modified, is equally tailored effectively to promote desegregation. 319 Once
a school desegregation plan is in place, the school board is under a
"heavy burden" of justifying shifts to "apparently less effective
method[s]" of desegregation.'14 A proposed modification that is less
effective for desegregation can be approved only when the court finds

that this reduction of effectiveness is necessary to promote a legitimate4
and important governmental interest, generally an educational interest.' '
"A court supervising the process of desegregation [does not] exercise
its remedial discretion responsibly where it approves a plan that, in hope
of providing better 'quality education' to some children, has a substantial
adverse effect upon the quality of education available to others.' 142
Second, the Court in Spangler I' 43 makes it clear that a desegregation

plan cannot be modified under Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) on the basis
of demographic changes not caused by official segregative conduct.'"

(Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905, 89 S. Ct. 1745 (1969). See Chrysler Corporation
v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 564, 62 S. Ct. 1146, 1150 (1942).
137. Jost, supra note 3, at 1104.
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
139. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744, 94 S. Ct. at 3126 (1974); Dayton 1, 433 U.S.
at 420, 97 S. Ct. 2775. See also supra note 30.
140. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 467, 92 S. Ct. at 2206; see also Dayton H1,
443 U.S. at 538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979; Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 81 S. Ct. 1694; Riddick,
784 F.2d at 535.
141. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 467, 92 S. Ct. at 2206; Dayton HI, 443 U.S.
at 538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979.
142. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 463, 92 S. Ct. at 2204.
143. 427 U.S. 424, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976).
144. Id. at 435-436, 96 S. Ct. at 2704 ("There was also no showing ... that those
post-1971 changes in the racial mix of some Pasadena schools . . . were in any manner
caused by segregative actions chargeable to the defendants ....
But as these shifts were
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The Court appears to regard demographic changes as foreseeable changes
which the original desegregation plan must take into account.1 45 If the
original desegregation plan does not take into account demographic
changes, including white flight, it is subject to reversal or modification
upon appeal. If it is not appealed, however, the parties cannot complain
about the effect that these demographic changes cause thereafter in the
school system. This change in the facts must be deemed to have been
contemplated by the original remedy' 46 and its relitigation foreclosed by

res judicata.
There are clearly some events that are not foreseeable. 47 These may
include certain events that have demographic effects. For example, a
flood may empty a portion of a school district. Similarly, a natural
disaster may render a portion of the school district so isolated as to
justify, under Keyes,141 the elimination of busing in and out of that
territory. Both such events may justify a change under the catch-all

clauses of Rule 60(b). They are unforeseeable demographic effects. The
demographic movements discussed in Spangler /,149 Swann,'5 and elsewhere, however, are gradual and incremental, not immediate.
Modification may also be justified in rare instances by causal attenuation that may occur during the implementation of the final desegregation plan. So much time may elapse between the time of the
formulation of the desegregation plan and the current time that a con-

not attributed to any segregative actions on the part of [the school board] ...[n]either
school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year
adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies ....").But see United States
v. Lawrence County Sch. Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1044-1046 (5th Cir. 1986) (Lawrence
County); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d at 1435; Devins, School
Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Courts' Abandonment of Brown v. Board of
Education, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 7, 29-30, 35-36 (1984); Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, supra note 9, at 596.
145. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 2704 ("quite normal pattern of human
migration"). See Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32, 91 S.Ct. at 1283 ("communities ...will
[not] remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile, society, few will do so.").
146. See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 592, 104 S.Ct. at 2595 (Stevens, J.,concurring in the
judgment) (possibility of adverse effect on blacks caused by future seniority based layoffs was "apparent" when decree entered, and as such was not "changed circumstances").
But see Lawrence County, 799 F.2d at 1043.
147. See Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 437, 96 S.Ct. 2705; Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.
Ct. 464 ("unexpected," "new and unforeseen"); Jost, supra note 3, at 1104; 1B Moore's
0.415, at 504-512. See Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576.
148. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203, 93 S. Ct. at 2695 ("This is not to say, of course, that
there can never be a case in which the geographical structure of, or the natural boundaries
within, a school district may have the effect of dividing the district into separate, identifiable
and unrelated units."); see Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S.
at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 1292.
149. 427 U.S. at 431-432, 436-437, 96 S.Ct. at 2702, 2704.
150. 402 U.S. at 26-28, 31-32, 91 S.Ct. at 1281, 1283.
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dition, previously, and correctly, found to be a vestige of segregation,
is no longer effectively caused by that prior segregative act. This is
arguably a change in circumstance under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5).
A defendant school board which had not properly implemented those
portions of the plan aimed at remedying this particular vestige' would
seek relief from this part of the judgment and would have the heavy
burden required under Rule 60(b)(5) to prove that "the relationship
between past segregative acts and present segregation ha[d] 'become so
attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure seg3
regation warranting judicial intervention." 1

2

Additionally, a desegregation decree that contains a busing component may be modified under a provision of the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 1718.15 This provision was in1 '54
tended to allow modification on "other than the normal equity ground.'
It permits the termination of the busing components not only when the
provisions of that component are fully implemented and satisfied, but
also when the court has made an independent and de novo finding that
the school district has otherwise satisfied the requirements of the Four5
teenth Amendment and will continue so to do.'

151. If the defendant school board had properly implemented the part of the plan at
issue, the obligation would be vacated as satisfied under Rule 60(b)(5) (first clause).
152. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. System Federation No.
91, 364 U.S. at 647-648, 81 S.Ct. at 371.
153. Section 1718 provides as follows:
Any court order requiring, directly or indirectly, the transportation of students
for the purpose of remedying a denial of the equal protection of the laws may,
to the extent of such transportation, be terminated if the court finds the
defendant educational agency has satisfied the requirements of the fifth or
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, whichever is applicable, and will
continue to be in compliance with the requirements thereof. The court of initial
jurisdiction shall state in its order the basis for any decision to terminate an
order pursuant to this section, and the termination of any order pursuant to
this section shall be stayed pending a final appeal or, in the event no appeal
is taken, until the time for any such appeal has expired. No additional order
requiring such educational agency to transport students for such purpose shall
be entered unless such agency is found not to have satisfied the requirements
of the fifth or fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, whichever is applicable.
154. Remarks of Sen. Javits, 120 Cong. Rec. 24891 (1974). But see Landsberg, supra
note 3, at 829 (20 U.S.C. § 1718 (1983) "rejects the equitable standard").
155. As Landsberg notes, an additional provision in the proposed Act requiring termination of busing upon a finding of unitary status was deleted by the Conference
Committee. The Conference Committee did not explain whether this provision was deemed
unconstitutional (but see Spangler 1), redundant, duplicative, inexpedient, or politically
unacceptable. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 829 n.190. See Conf. Rep. No. 1026, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4206, 4220-4221.
But see Landsberg, supra note 3,at 829-830.

1266

6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Many final decrees are in fact modified, often upon motion of the
school officials. Most are granted by consent after negotiations, and
few are reported.1 6 There are three primary kinds of modifications. The
first is when the school board asks that they be relieved from part of
the judgment because they have implemented that aspect of the plan.
This is the equivalent to a partial finding of unitariness and is discussed
herein.5 7 A second type of modification is based on an acknowledged
inability to implement the final desegregation plan. Such modifications
often take place with respect to magnet schools or other programs based
on voluntary enrollments, in which either the money has not been found
to accomplish the goals or the students did not enroll at the schools
to such a substantial degree so as to suggest that the plan was initially
based on inaccurate data or predictions or both. This is essentially a
confessed failure to implement and is also discussed herein. 58 The third
kind, and by far the most common, arises from a motion to modify
a plan because the school board has found the plan to be or to have
become impractical. 5 9 Such modifications can be based, under Rule
60(b), on new evidence, on a finding that the evidence offered at trial
was incorrect, or on changed circumstances. It seeks a re-balancing of
interests on a showing that educational goals are being inappropriately
subordinated in light of the proffered showing.'6
Thus, to approve the modification, the district court must not only
find that the new plan is properly tailored to continue to eliminate
segregation and the vestiges of segregation from the school system (or,
where not desegregative, promote other impQrtant interests), but it must
also find that the modification was justified under Rule 60(b), generally
by changes in law or unforeseeable changes in fact. A modification
approved by a court must, therefore, as a matter of res judicata, have
been determined to be consistent with the school officials' obligations
under Dayton H and Brown II.

156. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 813-814.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 248-255.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 258-265.
159. A difference between the impracticality of a plan and the ineffectiveness of a
plan should be recognized. The former denotes that the plan will not effectively educate
children; the latter that the plan will not eradicate segregation. A desegregation plan's
capability and likelihood of promoting education is not a necessary issue in its formulation,
while its sufficiency to eradicate segregation is not only a necessary issue, but the fundamental issue. Green, 391 U.S. at 437, 88 S. Ct. at 1693. See Landsberg, supra note
3, at 805 n.87.
160. See Devins, supra note 144, at 34. Devins claims that no suit has ever involved
this issue. Minor modifications are also sometimes made under the guise of clarifying or
interpreting the original injunction, thus avoiding the need for explicitly meeting the
prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Jost, supra note 3, at 1104 and n.29. Cf. Note,
supra note 69, at 1084-1086.
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SATISFACTION AND UNITARY STATUS

General Principle

It is a matter of black letter law that a judgment can be discharged
by payment or performance in full, thereby entitling the party against
whom it was rendered to have it deemed satisfied.1 61 Where a judgment
has been implemented by paying damages or restitution, by achieving
specific performance, or by implementing a mandatory injunction, the
judgment is satisfied and must be vacated. 62 Under such a circumstance,
"the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree ... have
[ ] been fully achieved."' 63 The decision whether a school system that
has been operating under a final order has achieved unitary status is
thus necessarily a determination of whether the defendants have implemented fully and faithfully all of the provisions (including subsequently
submitted plans) of the final order theretofore approved and modified
by the court." If so, the judgment and orders should be vacated.
This principle is recognized and codified in the first clause of Rule
60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(5) provides
in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may

relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ...
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; ... .165

161. Restatement (First) of Judgments § 46, at 178-179 (1942) (comment a: "If the
decree has been performed, and the plaintiff's claim has been satisfied thereby, such
satisfaction will extinguish the plaintiff's original claim and bar him from maintaining a
subsequent action on his original claim."). See 10 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (3d
rev. ed. 1984) § 35.32, at 319; Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1855).
60.26 [2], at 60-243 to 60-245. See Landsberg,
See generally 7 Moore's Federal Practice
supra note 3, at 811; but see id.at 811 n.121.
162. Sierra Club v. Mason, 365 F. Supp. 47, 49 (D. Conn. 1973) ("the order ex
proprio vigore require[s] something to be done, such that the judgment can be satisfied.").
163. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248, 88 S. Ct. at 1499; see Jost, supra note 3, at
1119, 1142 n.238 & n.239.
164. The determination of unitary status can be focused on some point other than
the date of the hearing, but at a date months or years earlier. This declaration nunc pro
tunc would then legitimize the district's subsequent non-integrative (through not intentionally discriminatory) conduct. See Spangler I, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (School
district had implemented the 1970 plan and had become unitary in 1971, but was only
so declared in 1979, after the Supreme Court's decision in 1976.). But see Dowell 11, 795
F.2d at 1522.
165. (Emphasis supplied.)
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The determination of unitariness is not based on the third clause, which

provides for modification or dissolution when "it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective effect." The logic of Dowell
v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools6 6 and the

thesis of a note published in the Fordham Law Review 67 are based on
a misapprehension of the grounds on which an injunction is affected
by a declaration of unitariness, contending that a declaration of unitariness operates only under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5).16 a Therefore, the Court must weigh all interests equitably, 69 including possible
equities arising from mere racial imbalances,170 and this balancing process
might lead to a decision other than vacating the injunction. 171 While a
judgment that has been fully satisfied clearly should have no further
prospective effect, Rule 60(b)(5) leaves no doubt that satisfaction of the
judgment per se precludes any further balancing of equities and requires
72
that the injunction be vacated.

The defendants have the burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that they have performed all of their duties

under a final desegregation order. A finding of unitary status under
this legal standard is a finding of fact 73 and is not an issue reviewable
under the "abuse of discretion" standard.

166.

74

The courts have been vir-

Dowell 11, 795 F.2d at 1516; Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 13-19 (10th

Cir. July 7, 1989).

167. Note, The Unitariness Finding and Its Effects on Mandatory Desegregation Injunctions, 55 Ford. L. Rev. 551 (1987). See also Jost, supra note 3, at 1158.
168. Note, supra note 167 at 564. Dowell 11 did not disturb the district court's finding
in Dowell I that the Oklahoma City Public Schools were unitary, but it held that this finding
did not necessarily vacate the outstanding injunction mandating the desegregation plan. See
also Dowell IV, No. 88-1067 (10th Cir. July 7, 1989) (opin. withdrawn Sept. 15, 1989).
169. Note, supra note 167, at 564-565.
170. But see Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S. Ct. at 1280 (no right to racial balance).
171. See, e.g., Dowell 11, 795 F.2d at 1523.
172. The equitable considerations suggested in Note, supra note 167, should be considered on a motion to modify the desegregation plan. The party suggesting the modification
would have the burden not only of showing that the Equal Protection Clause supported
this modification, but also that the modification was authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
173. Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 441, 96 S. Ct. at 2707 ("And while any determination
of compliance or noncompliance must, of course, comport with our holding today, it
must also depend on factual determinations which the Court of Appeals and the District
Court are in a far better position than we are to make in the first instance."); Riddick,
784 F.2d at 533; Vaughns v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983,
990 (4th Cir. 1985) (Vaughns). See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 457 n.6, 99 S. Ct. at 2946
n.6. See generally Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504
(1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
174. See Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 417-418, 97 S.Ct. at 2774 (describing standard of
review of remedies in terms of errors of fact or law, not abuse of discretion); Spangler
v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1979) (Spangler 11); Riddick,
784 F.2d at 533. The court in Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 326, did not expressly
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tually unanimous in maintaining that the mere adoption of a final
desegregation plan does not instantly convert a dual school system into
a unitary school system. Rather, consistent with Rule 60(b)(5), the judgment is satisfied only if the plan is fully and faithfully implemented by
1

the school board.

75

The satisfaction clause applies to mandatory orders and to orders
prohibitory in form but essentially mandatory in nature, i.e., "prohibited
from failing to do A and B" or "prohibited from doing B until you

do A. '17 6 Nevertheless, this principle is not easily applied to truly
prohibitory orders. 7 7 These orders fall into three categories. 17 The first
category encompasses general prohibitions against discriminatory conduct. However, the formulation of desegregation plans must be in terms
sufficiently specific and detailed such that implementation or failure to
implement is an observable and measurable phenomenon and not a
matter of guesswork. 79 Broad injunctions, therefore, are often void

characterize the standard of review employed but appears to have viewed the district
court's decision on unitariness as a finding of fact. Cf. Note, supra note 69, at 1070.
But see Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 12-13 (10th Cir. July 7, 1989); Gulf Coast
Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1510 (lth Cir. 1984);
C. Wright & A. Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2872, at 261-262 (1973).
Questions of the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts are ordinarily
held to be questions of "law" subject to de novo review. See General Building Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. at 393 n.19, 102 S.Ct. at 3151 n.19. But see Fiss, supra
note 9, at 27.
175. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 533 ("As we have previously stated, the mere implementation
of a desegregation plan does not convert a dual system into a unitary one."); United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency (South Park Indep. Sch. Dist.), 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1002 (1982); but see Spangler I, 427 U.S.
at 434, 96 S.Ct. at 2703 ("While the District Court found such a [constitutional] violation
in 1970, and while this unappealed finding afforded a basis for its initial requirement
that the defendants prepare a plan to remedy such racial segregation, its adoption of the
Pasedena plan in 1970 established a racially neutral system of student assignment in the
PUSD."). Cf. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 9, at 793.
176. See Note, supra note 69, at 1061-1063.
177. Cf. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897
(1953); Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464; Jost, supra note 3, at 1142, 1151;
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 811 n.121.
178. Cf. Fiss, supra note 9, at 7 (not only mandatory and prohibitive, but three other
types of injunctions: preventive, reparative, and structural). The application of the satisfaction clause would apply, under Professor Fiss's classification, to reparative and (if
such a mandate is valid) structural injunctions.
179. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 75, 88 S.Ct. 201, 207 (1967) ("Defendants .. .[must]
never be left to guess what they are forbidden to do"); Jost, supra note 3, at 1155-1156.
This applies not only to judgments as initially entered, but also to plans required subsequently to be submitted for approval.
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because "they are too vague to be understood."'' 10 The second category
includes orders prohibiting enforcement of particular constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or resolutions. These orders may comply
with Rule 65's mandate for specificity and are unquestionably valid until
the enforcement of the provision at issue is no longer a real threat.
This places a fairly heavy burden on a defendant seeking relief, except
when the provision had been repealed or substantially amended. In such
a case the "dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a
shadow."'' Most desegregation decrees no longer contain this injunction,
inasmuch as most segregation laws have been repealed, and facially
neutral attendance plans have been subsequently substantially altered to
eliminate the offending provisions. The third category consists of orders
perpetually prohibiting the defendant from engaging in specifically described conduct, e.g., selling meat at retail.' 82 Such a provision is also
valid under Rule 65(d). The latter two classes of injunctions are incapable
of being satisfied. Since Green, however, school desegregation plans as
a whole have been mandatory in nature even where they may contain
discrete prohibitory provisions.
In connection with the determination of unitary status, two other
questions are often discussed at the same hearing: whether the defendants
have engaged in any subsequent act of intentional discrimination unrelated to the final order; and whether the defendants will likely engage
in further acts of intentional discrimination whether related or not related
to the desegregation plan.8 3 These two factual determinations involve

180. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 389 U.S. at 74, 88 S. Ct. at 206 ("[An]
abstract conclusion of law [is not] an operative command capable of enforcement."');
id. at 76, 88 S. Ct. at 208 ("[Al federal court [must] frame its orders so that those who
must obey them will know what the court intends to require and what it means to
forbid."); Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S. Ct. 713 (1974); NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-436, 61 S. Ct. 693, 699 (1941); Payne v. Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835, 99 S.
Ct. 118 (1978); City of Mishawaka, Indiana v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976,
991 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, 101 S. Ct. 892 (1981); Jost, supra note
3, at 1155-1156; Fiss, supra note 9, at 13; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Note, supra note
69, at 1063-1067.
181. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464.
182. Swift, 286 U.S. at 111, 52 S. Ct. at 464.
183. In the July 16, 1984 brief in Keyes, the United States as amicus curiae posited
a two part test:
We have discussed in our February 8 memorandum the two-part test for determining whether a previously segregated system has become unitary. . . . In
short, the Court must ascertain:
(1) whether the defendant school authorities have fully and faithfully implemented a constitutionally-acceptable desegregation plan designed by the Court
and/or parties to eliminate all vestiges of the prior dual system; and
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supplemental claims that preclude the closing of the case and the termination of jurisdiction, 8 4 but are not directly involved in the determination of unitary status.
B.

Objections

A number of commentators" 5 and courts1 6 argue that in order for
a school district to be declared unitary the school officials must demonstrate, at the time of the determination, that the system has achieved
and maintained an acceptable level of "desegregation." This also entails

(2) whether the school officials have subsequently engaged in no intentional
segregative acts.
Memorandum at 2. The second part of this test is discussed as a supplemental claim,
infra text accompanying notes 395-405. Since unitary status means that the previous
constitutional violations have been remedied, the first decision is necessarily the only
element. See Spangler II, 611 F.2d at 1245 ("I have doubts whether there is always a
logical nexus between the objective of eliminating the effects of past violation and a
finding that a future violation might occur.) (Kennedy, J.,concurring). But see Dowell
II, 795 F.2d at 1522 ("[T]he consequence of the disobedience [may] have destroyed the
unitariness previously achieved by the district.").
184. See infra text accompanying notes 395-405.
185. See generally Williams, supra note 13, at 810; Chandler, The End of School
Busing? School Desegregation and the Finding of Unitary Status, 40 Okla. L. Rev. 519
(1987); Note, Unitariness and Busing: Placing the Burden of Proof for Obtaining Judicial
Review When a School Board Stops Busing, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 437, 451 (1988). Cf. Gewirtz,
Choice, supra note 9, at 794-796; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, supra note 9, at
657. Landsberg assumes that there will be a de novo examination to determine whether
vestiges have been eradicated. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 817-824. The Fordham note
suggests that the unitariness finding should have no operational effect unless it also
contains this sort of de novo review. Note, supra note 167, at 565. Cf. Jost, supra note
3, at 1151.
Some disagreement is based on "policy" rather than precedent. E.g., Note, supra at
454. This is the quintessential legislative question that is beyond the scope of this article.
186. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1983); but see id. at 95; Clark v.
Board of Educ. of Little Rock Sch. Dist., 705 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1983); Pate v.
Dade County Sch. Bd., 588 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855,
100 S.Ct. 67 (1979); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency (South Park Independent Sch.
Dist.), 647 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Riddick, both the trial and appellate address de novo whether the Norfolk School
Dist. remained unitary several years after it had been declared unitary. 627 F. Supp. 814
(E.D. Va. 1984). Landsberg, however, construes this analyses to "refer [ ] only to Norfolk's
good faith implementation of the busing plan." Landsberg, supra note 3, at 835. In any
event, this de novo examination added nothing to the courts' analysis. Both courts had
found that the district had been unitary in 1975, 784 F.2d at 529, and the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of that question,
784 F.2d at 531. Both courts further held that there had been no intervening intentionally
segregatory conduct that would have disturbed this unitary status. Thus, the inquiry as
to unitary status in 1984 merely prudently covered all bases and the findings were redundant
and the purest dicta. See also Dowell III.
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a showing that all vestiges of past intentional segregation (often including
residential segregation) have been eliminated and no longer even contribute to prevailing racial imbalances in schools." 7
This theory discounts the logic of the general law of judgments by
contending that the Supreme Court in Green and Swann implicitly created
a special rule of law for desegregation litigation, and established not
only the criteria for the formulation of a "transitional" desegregation
plan, but also the criteria for the determination of the "end-state" status
of a unitary school system.' However, the Supreme Court's decisions
in Swann and Green only addressed the formulation of an adequate
desegregation plan and do not conflict with res judicata. In Swann, the
original plan was modified because of the change in law announced by
Green. s9 The defendants' proposed plan in Green, a freedom of choice
arrangement, had been approved by the district court in 1966 and
affirmed in relevant part by the Court of Appeals.9' This approval was
the subject of the Supreme Court's original review of Green on certiorari.' 9' Thus, the district court's original approval had neither become
"final" nor attained "res judicata" effect. 92 While Green strongly mandates that the court ensure during the formulation of a plan that the
plan will be effective and promise realistically to work, once the plan
has been formulated and has received final court approval that plan
has all the attributes of a final judgment. The language in Green is in
each instance prospective-what the proposed plan must "promise" to
do-never retrospective. 93 The language in Swann is equally prospective.
Res judicata requires that the two decision points in the desegregation
process be evaluated by different criteria. The first decision point is the
formulation of the final order dismantling the dual system. The second
decision point is the determination of whether the school system has
achieved a unitary status.
Final desegregation decrees and orders are designed to correct all
discriminatory effects. 94 Prior constitutional violations are identified at
trial and addressed in the remedial orders. Trial courts must determine
that the remedial orders entered are fully adequate and tailored to

187. See Note, supra note 185, at 451.
188. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 830-831; Note, supra note 185, at 451; Note, supra
note 54, at 1477-1478 n.18.
189. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
190. Green, 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967).
191. Certiorari granted, 389 U.S. 1003 (1967).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 57-92.
193. Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 1695 ("The burden on the school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now.") (emphasis in original).
194. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 2705.
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eradicate forever all vestiges of prior segregation.' 95 Once that inquiry
has been made, however, the plan adopted by the court is judicially
determined to be an "effective" desegregation remedy. This is the critical
operational result of applying the doctrine of res judicata. The analysis
necessary and appropriate for the formulation and approval of a desegregation plan cannot be repeated, and the same issues thus relitigated,
in the determination of unitary status. 96 Prior segregative pupil assignments (and other violations) are remedied when the requirements of a
plan have been fully and nondiscriminatorily implemented by school
authorities, regardless of whether implementation of the plan successfully
achieved for all schools in the system the particular racial balance
projected by the plan. The validity of that original "effectiveness"
determination is in no way undermined by evidence that racial balance
and other remedial elements of a desegregation plan have not been
permanently achieved. Thus, like the unappealed desegregation plan
involved in Spangler 1,197 the merits of remedial measures previously
ordered by a court are not open to further judicial scrutiny except under
Rule 60(b).' 9
If compliance with a comprehensive, constitutionally valid court
order is not dispositive, then courts examining the "vestiges" question
will have little else to look to other than the raw numbers of student
enrollment and analogous factors.'9 At a minimum, this review would
be based on the six factors set forth in Green and on other concepts
of what is needed to attain "unitary" status. 200 If racial imbalances per

195. See Spangler II, 611 F.2d at 1242 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (While "original
findings of intentional discrimination, . . . are not phrased in terms of the incremental
segregative effect," the school system was found unitary). Contra, Landsberg, supra note
3, at 810.
196. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464 ("We are not framing a decree ....
The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment to the conditions
that existed at its making.").
197. 427 U.S. at 428, 96 S. Ct. at 2701 (1976).
198. Id. at 432, 96 S. Ct. at 2703 ("We do not have before us any issue as to the
validity of the District Court's original judgment, since [the previous school board] did
not appeal from it."); id. at 436-437, 96 S. Ct. at 2705 ("For having once implemented
a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional
violation on the part of the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function
of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.").
199. See, e.g., Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 991. Cf. Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 9, at 796798; Chandler, supra note 185, at 534-538.
200. See Note, supra note 185, at 451. Cf. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829
F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 609 F. Supp.
at 1498; Dowell III, 677 F. Supp. at 1506-1513. Such an inquiry would resemble in process
and effect a proceeding under 20 U.S.C. § 1718 (1982), see supra text accompanying
notes 153-155.
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se support an inference that a school district has not achieved unitary
status without any prerequisite finding of intentional discrimination or
bad faith implementation, then racial balance must be an essential element of a unitary school district. In effect, this equates "racial balance"
with "effective desegregation. ' 20 But the Constitution does not require,
either as a matter of right or as a matter of remedy, a particular racial
balance in public schools. 202 "The clear import ... from Swann is that
desegregation, in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does
not require any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or
classroom.' "203
The Supreme Court has firmly established that valid desegregation
plans may not be judicially altered periodically in order to maintain
racial balance, and that even absent discrimination, neither school attendance nor residential patterns are likely to be in racial balance. A
desegregation plan may not be declared a failure because it falls short
of achieving a "particular degree of racial balance or mixing" in some
schools. 20 4 The achievement of certain racial percentages cannot be imposed as an "inflexible requirement" on school boards. 205 While the
current degree of racial balance in school systems has an obvious relevance to any discrimination inquiry, 206 that consideration is not dis-

201. Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 434, 96 S. Ct. at 2703; Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S.
Ct. at 1280; but see id. at 26-27; cf. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 806.
202.

Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 434, 438, 96 S. Ct. at 2703, 2705; Swann, 402 U.S. at

24-25, 91 S. Ct. at 1280 (mathematical ratios not an inflexible requirement in formulating
remedial orders); Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 464, 92 S.Ct. at 2204.
203. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 740-741, 94 S.Ct. at 3125 (footnote omitted); see id. at
763-764, 94 S.Ct. at 3136 (White, J.,joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). As noted in South Park Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 439 U.S. 1007,
1011, 99 S. Ct. 622, 624 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari):
when taken together, is that a district
The thrust of Swann and [Spangler 1],
court must heed the Swann mandate to closely scrutinize predominantly onerace schools when approving an initial desegregation plan in a school district
with a history of de jure segregation, but that the District Court has no
obligation, indeed, has no authority, to monitor the plan indefinitely to make
sure that the initial Swann requirements are maintained year after year in spite
of demographic changes which are in no way attributable to the school board.
A unanimous Court in Swann made clear that the Constitution requires the
dismantling of dual school systems, but does not mandate racial balance in
schools.
204. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 434, 96 S. Ct. at 2703.
205. Id.
206. The racial percentages actually achieved under the plan and similar statistical
measures and indices are relevant insofar as they are probative of bad faith implementation
of the desegregation plan by the school board or of post-judgment intentional segregative
conduct. Ifthe absence of racial balance stems from the board's failure to carry out the
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positive of whether the school board has indeed taken all steps necessary
to render the system "unitary."
C.

Application

The doctrine of res judicata and the satisfaction of judgments clause
of Rule 60(b)(5) have been applied in areas outside of desegregation
law in a number of proceedings, but primarily in the area of environmental law. 207 These principles were applied by the Supreme Court to
the question of unitary status in desegregation litigation in Pasadena
Board of Education v. Spangler,20 and have thereafter been explicitly
applied in the First and Ninth Circuits, and possibly in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.
In Spangler I, the district court approved a system-wide student
assignment plan in 1970 designed to implement its order that no school
in the Pasadena school district have "a majority of any minority students.''2°9 The school district achieved the racial percentages mandated
by this order in the first year of the plan's implementation, but gradually
"'slipped out of compliance ' ' 210 with the "no majority" requirement

plan's requirements, then full and faithful implementation has not occurred and unitariness
has therefore not been achieved: The judgment has not been satisfied. If the imbalance
results from subsequent intentionally segregative acts by the board, then a new constitutional violation has occurred, necessitating further corrective action by the Court. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), and infra text accompanying notes 394-405. If, on the other hand,
the imbalance is due to events not attributable to the school board, such as demographic
changes and/or student population changes, then the imbalance provides no basis for
finding either that the board has not carried out its affirmative duty to desegregate or
that it has engaged in post-judgment unconstitutional conduct requiring further remedial
action. The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether the school board is responsible for racial
percentage "shortfalls." If not, then the court cannot view such "shortfalls" as a condition
that evidences continuing segregation or requires corrective action. Since racial imbalance
not resulting from official discrimination is not a "condition that offends the Constitution"
(Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 738, 94 S. Ct. at 3124; id. at 757, 94 S.Ct. at 3133) (Stewart,
J., concurring), there is simply nothing "to correct." This is the teaching of Spangler I,
427 U.S. at 435-437, 96 S. Ct. at 2704.
As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 93-160, this evidence may also be relevant
to modification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The imbalance may have resulted from
mistake, fraud, or events-not including ordinary demographic change-that the court
could not have foreseen.
207. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 342
F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (E.D. Ariz.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 931, 93 S. Ct. 2749 (1973); Sierra Club v. Mason, 365 F. Supp. 47 (D. Conn.
1973); and Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 609 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Cf. Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 223 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955).
208. 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697 (1976).
209. Id. at 427-428, 96 S. Ct. at 2700.
210. Id. at 433, 96 S.Ct. at 2703.
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in ensuing years. In 1974, the school district unsuccessfully moved the
district court to dissolve the "no majority" order. 21 1 On appeal, the
district court's denial was affirmed because the school district's "failure
to maintain literal compliance with the ['no majority' requirement of
the] 1970 injunction indicated that the district court had not abused its
discretion in refusing to grant so much of petitioner's motion for mod'21 2
ification as pertained to this aspect of the order.
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and held
that the district court had exceeded its remedial authority in seeking to
mandate racial percentages among students in Pasadena schools after
1971.213 The Court emphasized that the desegregation plan ordered by
21 4
the district court was "designed" to achieve a unitary school system
and that "[t]here was . .. no showing . . . that those post-1971 changes
in the racial mix of some Pasadena schools . . . were in any manner
caused by segregative actions chargeable to the defendants. ' 215 The Court
concluded:
In this case the District Court approved a plan designed to
obtain racial neutrality in the attendance of students at Pasadena's public schools. No one disputes that the initial implementation of this plan accomplished that objective. That being
the case, the District Court was not entitled to require the [school
board] to rearrange its attendance zones each year so as to
ensure that the racial mix desired by the court was maintained
in perpetuity. For having once implemented a racially neutral
attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional
violations on the part of the defendants, the District Court had
fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy
21 6
for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.
Thus, the Court held that the resolution of whether a dual system of
student assignment has been remedied turns on whether the district
court's "adoption of [a pupil assignment plan] established a racially

211.
212.

Id. at 431, 96 S. Ct. at 2702.

Id. at 431-432 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 433-435, 96 S. Ct. at 2703. The Court noted that "Judge Chambers thought
that as soon as the PUSD was brought into compliance with [the 1970] order, the
mandatory injunction should be terminated [519 F.2d 430] at 440 [(1975)]." Id. at 432
n.1.
214. Id. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 2705 ("[T]he District Court approved a plan designed
to obtain racial neutrality in the attendance of students at Pasadena's public schools.").
215. Id. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704.
216. Id. at 436-437, 96 S. Ct. at 2704 (emphasis in original). The dissent also appears
to recognize "that a fully desegregated school system may not be compelled to adjust
attendance zones to conform to changing demographic patterns." Id. at 443, 444 n.1, 96
S. Ct. at 2703 n.l (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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neutral system of student assignment in the [school district].1 11 7 The
decision by the district court in approving the desegregation plan that
the conduct required in the plan was both necessary and sufficient to
remedy prior constitutional violations then became res judicata as to
this school district.2 1 8 Hence, full implementation of the student assignment components of a desegregation decree ordered by a court to achieve
a unitary school system pursuant to this holding satisfies the judgment
and establishes 'a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis.""'2 9 Therefore, the court's remedial function is
"fully performed" by "once implement[ing] a racially neutral attendance

pattern. ''220
An unfriendly but accurate commentator, Professor Jost, described
the meaning of Spangler:
However, Swann barred a "no majority of any minority"
requirement only in a situation in which de jure segregation had
been eliminated and a unified district achieved. [402 U.S. at 3132]. If a unified school district had not yet been achieved by
the time modification was requested, and if the effects of past
de jure discrimination had not yet been eliminated, the "no
majority of any minority" requirement would continue to be
appropriate until such time as those goals were reached, even
under Swann. Justice Rehnquist's opinion [in Spangler 1] would
advise the district court only that is [sic] must modify its order
at that time. For the Court to determine that the obligors were
immediately entitled to relief from the "no majority of any
minority" requirement, . . . [the Supreme Court] had to determine not only that the requirement might someday cease to be
appropriate but also that [the "no majority of any minority"
... requirement] was currently not necessary and that a unified
22 1
district had in fact been achieved.
Thus, the majority in Spangler I, much to the chagrin of Professor
Jost, found that the full implementation of the Pasadena plan for only
one year resulted in the achievement of a fully unitary district. Professor
Jost further complained: "Rehnquist unconvincingly rejected the district

217. Id.at 434, 96 S. Ct. at 2703.
218. See id.at 432, 96 S.Ct. at 2703.
219. Id. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2704. Professor Fiss implicitly suggests that this result

follows from the litigation "model" that "the remedy is designed to correct or prevent
a discrete event, and the judicial function usually exhausts itself when the judgment is
announced and the amount of damages calculated or the decree aimed at some discrete
event is issued." Fiss, supra note 27, at 27.
220.
221.

Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 437, 96 S. Ct. at 2705.
Jost, supra note 3, at 1157. Cf. Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 988.
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court's determination on this matter .... [H]e determined that the defendants were, for one school term, technically in compliance with this
requirement and interpreted this to mean that any further required
compliance was unnecessary to protect the beneficiary and was unduly
'
oppressive to the ... [school board]." 222
The court acknowledged that
racial imbalance existed among the Pasadena school system that would
have been unacceptable in a non-unitary system, but no further examination of the current racial balance in the system was either undertaken or requested. Justice Rehnquist, according to Jost, held that
if compliance had been achieved, the decree had to be partially vacated,22
for the continued existence of the decree provided no benefit to which
the beneficiary was legally entitled.
A district court, therefore, must make a declaration of unitary status
once it has determined that the defendants have fully and faithfully
implemented the desegregation plan approved by the court.2 24 Consistent
with Rule 60(b)(5) (satisfaction) and the doctrine of res judicata, the
Spangler I analysis applies not merely to student assignments. Whatever
remedial tools are employed by a court to cure a dual school system,
once they are fully implemented throughout the system, the formerly
22 5
dual system must be regarded in this respect as "unitary.1

In Spangler I, the Supreme Court explicitly applied to the Pasadena
system the implicit logic of Swann, as shown by Chief Justice Burger's
reflection:
It does not follow that the communities served by [unitary]
systems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing,
mobile society, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor
district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year
adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once
the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and
racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from

222. Jost, supra note 3,at 1158.
223. Id.
224. Even the (Ford) Department of Justice so stated:
At oral argument the Solicitor General discussed the Government's belief that
if,
as petitioners have represented, they have complied with the District Court's
order during the intervening two years, [from 1974 to 19761 they will probably
be entitled to a lifting of the District Court's order in its entirety. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28.
Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 441, 96 S. Ct. at 2707 (emphasis added). Professor Landsberg
was on the Brief for the United States in both Spangler I and Spangler II, 427 U.S. at
426; 611 F.2d at 1239. See also Note, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
56, 221, 223 ("Having implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern once ...even
briefly.") (emphasis added); Note, supra note 23, at 199.
225. Cf. Spangler I, 611 F.2d at 1243 & n.3 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
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the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without
power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a
showing that either the school authorities or some other agency
of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools,6
further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.22
Reexamination of the findings as to the remedy and reformulation of
the desegregation plan are precisely the "further intervention" that the
Court unanimously held not to be "necessary."
Two appellate court decisions governing the declaration of unitary
status in a desegregation case, Spangler 11 and Morgan v. Nucci, have
applied the foregoing principles. 22 In Spangler

11,228

after the Supreme

Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district
court on remand had subsequently erred by refusing to lift its remedial
order in its entirety.229 The opinion by Judge Goodwin, emphasizing
that "[t]he displacement of local government by a federal court is
presumed to be temporary," held that the district court had "ignored
... the Board's present compliance," and that "vague charges about
lack of aggressiveness, or differences of opinion about who can best
manage the future course of desegregation in a troubled school district,
are insufficient grounds for the permanent interposition of judicial control over an activity of local government that by law is consigned to
an elected school board.

2 30
1

Judge (now Justice) Kennedy's opinion more precisely set forth the
21
standard for requiring a district court to terminate its remedial orders. 1
Relying on the Supreme Court's above-quoted directions on remand,
Judge Kennedy noted that Pasadena was "in substantial compliance with
the [desegregation] plan for the period 1970-1974 ... [and] total compliance [since that time]. ' 23 2 Accordingly, he concluded that "compliance
with the Pasadena Plan for nine years is sufficient in this case, given
the nature and degree of the initial violation, to cure the effects of

226. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32, 91 S. Ct. at 1283.
227. Landsberg believes that Riddick also followed this doctrine. Landsberg, supra
court order by
note 3,at 798, 835. See also Note, supra note 185, at 439. The district
which the Norfolk public schools were declared unitary does state "that the School Board
of the City of Norfolk has satisfied its affirmative duty to desegregate." Riddick, 784
F.2d at 525 (emphasis added).
228. Spangler H, 611 F.2d at 1239.
229. Id.at1242.
230. Id.at 1241.
231. Judge Kennedy's opinion received the concurrence of Judge Anderson, the third
judge on the panel, giving his opinion, together with Judge Goodwin's opinion, the full
authority of the Ninth Circuit. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537 n.16.
232. Spangler H, 611 F.2d at 1243.
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previous improper assignment policies. Further delay in returning full
'
responsibility for administration to the school board is unjustified."233
Neither judge examined the contemporaneous racial configuration of the
Pasadena schools. Compliance with the final desegregation plan was
234
deemed to be critical.
In the Boston school case, Morgan v. O'Bryant,2"5 the First Circuit
noted that, under Spangler I, "absent any showing that school population
changes were the result of segregative actions by the defendants or the
result of some other constitutional violation, the district court's power
to decree a remedy had ended when it implemented its earlier plan.' '236
The Court subsequently, in Morgan v. Nucci, postulated three "general
inquiries" as to whether the Boston schools have achieved unitariness
in student assignments: first, what is the number of one-race or racially
identifiable schools; second, have the school defendants demonstrated
good faith in the desegregation effort and the running of the schools;
and third, has maximum practicable desegregation of student bodies at
the various schools been attained.23 7 Thereafter, the Court measured all
three of its tests of unitariness in every instance against the previously
approved desegregation plan.23 While the Court examined the number
of one-race or racially identifiable schools, it excused each instance of
identifiability by reference to the district court's order.23 9 Good faith
was measured by the defendants' implementation of the plan. 24° Lastly,
the Court gave no consideration to whether any greater degree of de24
segregation than that contemplated by the original plan was feasible. '
The Eleventh Circuit followed this doctrine, perhaps inadvertently
and clearly without substantial analysis, in United States v. Board of

233. Id. at 1244.
234. See id. at 1243 & n.2 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf. Haycraft v. Board of Educ.,
560 F.2d 755, 756 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d
992, 994 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).
235. 687 F.2d 510 (1st Cir. 1982).
236. Id. at 517. The Boston school system was found unitary in Morgan v. Nucci,
831 F.2d 313 (lst Cir. 1987) (Nucci).
237. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 319.
238. See also id. at 329 n.25 ("[W]e have no doubt that if the BTU or any defendant
demonstrated complete compliance with all outstanding faculty and staff orders, the court
would withdraw entirely from the school's staffing decisions" citing Spangler I, 427 U.S.
at 436).
239. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 319-321.
240. Id. at 321-322. But see Note, The Unitariness Dilemma: The First Circuit's Attempt
to Develop a Test for Determining When a System is Unitary, 66 Wash. U.L.Q. 615,
637-638 (1988).
241. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 317-326. The district court had found by approving the original
plan that it had mandated the maximum feasible desegregation. Swann, 402 U.S. at 26,
91 S. Ct. at 1282.
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Education of Jackson County.242 There the Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal of a desegregation case and vacation of injunctions "because the 1970 order [had], in effect, been complied with." 243 The Fifth
Circuit recently has acknowledged without criticism and perhaps with
greater advertence the specific application of this doctrine: "the district
court announced that it would grant Oxford's motion to dismiss the
[desegregation] order unless appellants showed either that Oxford had
failed to comply with the court's order or that supplemental relief was
244
in order."
The Tenth Circuit has recently had before different panels of the
court three cases involving the unitary status of school districts. 245 An
opinion was issued on July 7, 1989, in Dowell IV, but then withdrawn.
As discussed below, this majority opinion did not focus on the recognition of unitary status, but rather denies any decisive legal significance
to such a finding. An opinion in Brown III (with an unreleased dissenting
opinion by Judge Baldock) was issued June 2, 1989, but was subsequently, withdrawn on July 19, 1989. This opinion contained language
substantially supporting the analysis here advanced, stating that "[wihere
the school district has complied with the desegregation plan to the best
of its ability, and has done what can be done in spite of the obstacles
in its way, it is reasonable to conclude that no further desegregation is
feasible," and that "[tihe present case is one of those rare ones in
which the unitariness determination is not directly tied to the execution
of a particular desegregation plan." '
As of this writing, no opinion
has been issued in Keyes 11.
D.

Summary

Thus, when a court scrutinizes a public school district for possible
violations of constitutional rights, it does not focus on the current
circumstances. It must focus on the cause of those circumstances. A
slight racial imbalance-or no imbalance at all-that is caused by intentional discrimination violates the Constitution. A gross disparity that

242. 794 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986).
243. Id. at 1543. Similar language is found in Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at
1413-1414, that a "school system which was previously segregated can become fully unitary
after implementing a constitutionally acceptable plan and operating in a manner in which
'the State does not discriminate between public school children on the basis of race.'
See Lawrence County, 799 F.2d at 1055-1058 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
244. Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1989).
245. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, No. 87-1668 (Brown III); Dowell v. Board
of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., No. 88-1067 (Dowell I) (opin. withdrawn Sept. 15,
1989); and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., Nos. 85-2814, 87-2634 (Keyes I1).
246. Brown III, No. 87-1668, slip op. at 26-27 (10th Cir. June 2, 1989) (withdrawn,
July 19, 1989).
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is not caused by intentional official discrimination does not. All inquiries
as to cause are historical, for causality is a historical event. It is not
the present, but the past, that is the touchstone.
When a school district has been involved in desegregation litigation
in the past, the previous proceedings are part of this historical inquiry.
Assume that in that past litigation, the court determined that there was
official, intentional discrimination. No one appears to want that decision
re-examined or relitigated. Subject to Rule 60(b), 'it is res judicata, and
the determination is binding on the subsequent inquiry. Where the courts
made that previous determination, the court will have determined, secondly, what injuries the plaintiffs sustained as a result of the identified
intentional discrimination. Those injuries may include current injuries
and also conditions that continue to cause injuries in the future ("vestiges
of segregation"). This second determination is also res judicata, though
many appear to want this determination re-examined and to add more
injuries and more existing conditions to its list.
Thirdly, the court will have determined what conduct was necessary
to "remedy" the situation, to put the plaintiff in the place where the
plaintiff would have been had the intentional discrimination not occurred
("remedy"). This may involve a payment of money ("damages"), or
it may involve an order not to do certain specific and described acts
or to do certain equally specific and described acts ("injunction" or
"desegregation plan"). This is again res judicata, but whether this
determination may be re-examined and relitigated is very much the
question at bar.
. The court may or may not have made a fourth determination:
whether the conduct required by the third determination ("remedy")
has been implemented. Where this determination has already been made,
it is also res judicata. Whether this determination may be relitigated
has not been widely debated because its significance depends almost
exclusively on the binding nature of the third determination.
If the court's second determination ("vestiges") is res judicata, then
injuries that the court had not previously found to have resulted from
the intentional official discrimination cannot be subsequently examined
(except under Rule 60(b)) as having been possibly caused by that discriminatory conduct. A succeeding court should not then find these
conditions to be constitutionally offensive unless it independently finds
them to have been caused by intentional official discrimination.
If the court's third determination ("remedy") is res judicata, then
only the conduct required by that determination-the payment of money
or the doing or avoiding of certain acts-was necessary to correct the
identified injuries, again, except as modified under Rule 60(b). And, as
a logically necessary corollary, the performance of that conduct did in
fact correct the previously identified injuries and satisfy the previously
imposed obligation.
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If the injuries found to have resulted from the previously identified
intentional discrimination have been subsequently corrected, then the
current state of affairs cannot result from the intentional discrimination
247
previously identified, and the examining court is back to square one.
A de novo review of the unitary status of a school district logically
denies the operation of res judicata in the second and third determinations. Such a review always re-examines the third determination ("remedy"), and often re-examines the second determination ("vestiges").
9.

PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION

The Supreme Court has also stated that the decree may be satisfied
in whole or in part, answering, as well, the question "whether," as the
district court put it in a subsequent opinion in Keyes, "it is appropriate
to parse the criteria in Green ... to separate out pupil assignments
' 24
from the other elements. 1
The fact that a school district has remedied its formerly dual system
of student assignment does not, in and of itself, render the district
"unitary" as a whole. The Supreme Court in Green recognized at least
six discrete components of a school system, including student assignment,
which must be cleansed of the vestiges of past unconstitutional segregation before the system as a whole can be declared unitary.2 49 Indeed,
in Spangler I, the Court expressly observed that, notwithstanding the
Pasadena School Board's fulfillment of its remedial obligation regarding
student assignments, the Pasadena school district was not entitled to a
declaration of unitariness until it had fulfilled its remedial obligations
regarding all elements of the system. 2 0 Conversely, however, the Court
made it clear that a school district need not be unitary in every respect
before it is entitled to be released from the requirements of a desegregation decree pertaining to a component of the old dual system, such
as student assignments, that have been fully fulfilled. Despite the fact
that in other components of the Pasadena school system the remedy
had not been implemented, and vestiges of Pasadena's dual system
therefore apparently survived, the Spangler Court ruled that the district
court's remedial authority over student assignment had expired when

247. Almost. Anyone who participated in the previous litigation cannot now claim
that the present state of affairs is the result of intentional discrimination that was involved
or should have been involved in the previous litigation. The court must determine whether
there was intentional discrimination after the entry of the judgment in the previous
litigation.
248. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 609 F. Supp. at 1516.
249. In addition to student assignments, the components of a school system identified
by the Green court were faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and
facilities. Green, 391 U.S. at 435, 88 S. Ct. at 1693.
250. Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 1204.

1284

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

the requirements of the desegregation decree pertaining to assignment
had been fully and properly implemented. 2 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court
expressly found "little substance" in the argument that the district court
should retain authority to impose the "no majority of any minority"
requirement "at least until the school system achieved 'unitary' status
in all other respects such as the hiring and promoting of teachers and

administrators.'

'252

In dissent, Justice Marshall advanced precisely the "all or nothing"
reasoning which he recognized had been rejected by the Spangler I
majority:
I see no reason to require the District Court in a case such as
this to modify its order prior to the time that it is clear that
the entire violation has been remedied and a unitary system has
253
been achieved.
Thus, an inquiry into whether a school district as a whole has achieved
unitary status is comprised of a series of inquiries into the unitariness
of the discrete components of the system. 25 4 As to each such component,
the district court's remedial authority expires upon the full and proper
implementation of the pertinent provisions of a desegregation decree
designed to achieve unitary status. Not until all requirements of a school
desegregation decree have been fully implemented-that is, not until the
dual system has been dismantled with respect to all discrete components
of the system-can the system as a whole be declared unitary and
5
25
jurisdiction over the case be terminated.
10.

IMPERFECT IMPLEMENTATION

Final orders are not always implemented to the last detail. Implementation of the mandatory aspects of the final order is not always
perfectly accomplished.
One common example of alleged "imperfect implementation" occurs
where the court specifically mandates school boundaries and the schools

251. Id. Professor Jost disapprovingly noted that Justice Rehnquist "[f]irst ... isolated
the initial decree's 'no majority of any minority' pupil assignment requirement from its
hiring, promotion, and other requirements." Jost, supra note 3, at 1158 (footnote omitted).
See Chandler, supra note 185, at 530; Note, supra note 224, at 221, 223.
252. Id. at 438, n.5. See id. at 442. See also, Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of
Mobile County, 430 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318.
253. Spangler 1,427 U.S. at 444, 96 S. Ct. at 2708 (footnote omitted); see also 427
U.S. at 442, 96 S. Ct. at 2707.
254. Note, supra note 224, at 223; Chandler, supra note 185, at 530. See Spangler I,
427 U.S. at 436, 438 n.5, 96 S. Ct. at 2704, 2705 n.5; Nucci, 831 F.2d at 318-319.
255. Where partial unitary status has been found, the court should not only clearly
state what part of previous orders remain in force, but it should set a date for a new
hearing on the remaining parts of the decree. See Chandler, supra note 185, at 554.
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nevertheless fail to enroll the appropriate racial percentages. This hag
often been denounced as an allegedly "ineffective plan." As noted in
the Boston case, 2 6 even where racially identifiable schools exist, so long
as those schools are in compliance with the court's own student assignment order, the plan has been-in this respect, at least-perfectly
implemented. The defendants have done every act contemplated by the
decree and the existence of these schools will not preclude a finding of
unitariness. In a situation where the court initially sets a percentage,
but then specifically approves assignment criteria (including district lines)
proposed by the defendants, the analysis is the same as in Nucci.
A distinction should be made between a plan in which the court
approves attendance district lines, and then predicts that these districts
will have certain racial percentages (the Boston plan), and a plan in
which the court requires that a certain racial percentage (often with a
specified margin of flexibility) must be met but allows the school district
without further court approval to draw the lines. 57
Of course, if the court finds that it was misled by inaccurate information provided by the defendants, and it used this information
either in formulating the remedy or in approving student assignment
criteria, then the judgment must be vacated under the general criteria
of Rule 60(b). An analogous analysis can be used for other aspects of
a plan.
Nevertheless, there are, in fact, instances of imperfect implementation
of a judgment. While perfect implementation of the final desegregation
plan entitles the school district to be released from the judgment, imperfect implementation does not necessarily preclude the court from
determining that the school district is unitary and that the judgment
258
has been satisfied.
The critical inquiry is whether the imperfections in implementation,
either "shortfalls" in the racial composition of schools or other failures,
were substantial,2 5 9 were substantive rather than technical, 260 and were

256. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 320-321.
257. Thus, school officials can control the assignments of students but cannot control
enrollments of students. Id. at 322-323. The defendants in this instance must bear the
additional burden of persuasion that the assignment criteria which they formulated and
used were in fact suitable to achieve the required racial percentages, but failed to do so
for reasons entirely beyond the control of the defendants.
258. See Ross v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[lmmutable
geographic factors and post-desegregation demographic changes that prevent the homogenation of all student bodies do not bar judicial recognition that the school system is
unitary"). Cf. United States v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d 992, 995, 996 (5th
Cir. 1977).
259. See Nucci, 831 F.2d at 322 ("substantial compliance"), 325 ("noncompliance . . .
relatively slight").
260. Id. at 322-324; Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 1982) (Under
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caused by the deliberate conduct-action or inaction-of school officials.

There will, of course, be instances in which a district court will
find that the school district has not in fact substantially implemented
a final desegregation judgment. In some cases this failure of implementation will be beyond the control of the defendants. 261 One of these
instances occurs where the defendant lacked funds to implement all or
significant portions of the decree.2 62 Where the defendants have been
precluded from implementing the plan by matters beyond their control,
the court should simply extend the time during which the plan should

be implemented, or otherwise modify the plan no more than necessary
to take into consideration those changed circumstances beyond the defendant's control. Where persons other than the defendants interfere
with the judgment, but the judgment can be fully implemented by
enjoining those persons as well, those persons should be enjoined from
263
interfering with the judgment of the court.
In other instances, however, the failure to implement will be caused
by the defendants. The school board may, either because of intentional
segregatory purposes or for other reasons, fail to put the plan into
place. These other reasons may well include legal disagreements as to
the propriety of the plan, disagreements as to the educational benefit

of the plan, or the like. In any event, whether discriminatory or nondiscriminatory, these reasons constitute bad faith and intentional disobedience by the defendants. Nevertheless, the desegregation order remains
valid as a judgment, its determinations as to the necessity and sufficiency
of remedial measures remain a binding adjudication, and failure to

Spangler I, "absent any showing that school population changes were the result of
segregative actions by the defendants or the result of some other constitutional violation,
the district court's power to decree a remedy had ended when it implemented its earlier
plan."). Technical provisions would ordinarily include reporting and notification requirements.
261. Such a failure to implement must be distinguished from instances where the
defendants in fact do every act contemplated by the decree, but this implementation fails
to produce the expected results.
262. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1988) [hereinafter
La. Higher Education].
263. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11-12, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958); see Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. at 458, 92 S. Ct. at 2201 (new defendants added and enjoined from
interfering with implementation of desegregation plan); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974). Cf. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45, 91 S. Ct. 1284, 1285; United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 92 S. Ct. 2214 (1972); Hills, 425 U.S. at 289 n.8, 96 S. Ct. at
1542 n.8; United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171-176, 98 S.Ct.
364, 372-374 (1977); Note, supra note 54, at 1479 & n.24; Note, supra note 69, at 10281031. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1966) ("All Writs Act"). Cf. 18 U.S.C. 1509 (1984),
discussed at Fiss, supra note 9, at 16-18.
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implement, alone, does not constitute grounds for the reconsideration
of its provisions. 26 Contempt penalties should be considered where individuals are identified as inhibiting or interfering with the implemen265
tation of the decree.
11.

EFFECT OF UNITARY STATUS

Where a school district has been declared "unitary", all injunctions
should be dissolved, and, where no supplemental claims have been filed,
jurisdiction should be terminated and the case closed. 2 6 The school
district is thereafter held only to an intent standard for determining a
constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause, and the
parties are precluded from relitigating the remedy for the previous seg267
regation.
12.

THE DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS AND THE INTENT STANDARD

The decision to dissolve the injunction, as the Tenth Circuit in
Dowell II pointed out, does not occur ipso facto when a district is

264. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 441 n.21, 106
S. Ct. at 3032 n.21 ("In any event 'contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration
the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become
a retrial of the original controversy.' "); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,
313, 87 S. Ct. 1824, 1828 (1967); United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 756, 103 S.
Ct. 1548, 1551 (1983); 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2960, at 597. But see United
States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 649 (E.D. La. 1988); Nucci, 831 F.2d at 331. Cf.
Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 993. When failure to implement also involves new acts of intentional
discrimination, such discrimination and its effects must also be remedied. Lawrence County,
799 F.2d at 1035, 1042. Consent decrees, of course, are not adjudications and the parties
cannot be held to an agreement for which there was neither timely nor substantial provision
of the consideration for which they bargained.
265. But see Paradise, 480 U.S. at 175 n.25, 107 S. Ct. at 1069 n.25; Fiss, supra
note 9, at 36. Contempt may be used to compensate the plaintiff for injury arising from
the want of compliance. Id. at 54.
266. There may be a metaphysical or ontological difference between closing a case
and terminating the court's jurisdiction but, for the purpose of this paper, these two
terms shall be treated as synonymous. On the other hand, there appears to be a difference
between dismissing a case and closing the case or terminating jurisdiction. Dismissal implies
that the claim for relief was not successful for substantive or procedural reasons. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. Obviously this is not the case where a final desegregation order has
been fully implemented. There is also a significant difference between closing a case and
terminating jurisdiction, and placing a case in "inactive" status and continuing to enforce
all injunctions.
267. An effect of unitary status not inherently required by the doctrine of res judicata
is that attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981) are no longer paid to the plaintiffs
because there is no longer a party which has prevailed on liability. Quarles v. Oxford
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1989). Another effect is that local
defendants are no longer able to obtain contribution from state officials as actual or
potential defendants to finance local programs plausibly correcting previous constitutional
violations. School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987); Ross v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1983).
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declared unitary. 261 In Riddick, the Fourth Circuit accepted the district
court's finding that the district court's 1975 order declaring the school

district unitary had also in fact dissolved the same court's earlier injunction. 269 In United States v. Overton, where the decree "by its own

terms" ceased on a specific event, the decree did, in fact, end automatically. 2 0 The better procedure is to enter an explicit and formal
271
judgment dissolving the injunction.
A.

Absence of Special Obligation

The real question is not whether the unitariness declaration ipso
facto dissolves the outstanding injunctions, but whether the declaration
recognizes that the defendant no longer has any special obligation-and
272
the plaintiff any special right-that is enforceable by an injunction.
The general duty of the defendants-and all state officials-under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not enforceable
by an injunction. 273 If there is no such special obligation, this dissolution
should follow the declaration as an important but ministerial formality.
And there is no such special obligation. A school desegregation

decree is designed to be a temporary remedial measure. 274 It effects "a

268. Dowell II, 795 F.2d at 1519-1520; Chandler, supra note 185, at 540-541; Landsberg,
supra note 3, at 827. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 (separate document). Until the injunction
is formally dissolved, the parties are obliged to follow it under pain of contempt. Spangler
1, 429 U.S. at 438-540, 96 S.Ct. at 2705. Disobedience to an order by a school district
that has in fact become unitary, however, when not motivated by racial discrimination,
does not preclude a finding of unitariness though it may invoke other appropriate punishment. Id.
269. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 799-800. See Vaughns,
758 F.2d at 990; Note, supra note 167, at 574-575.
270. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1173; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 815, n.135. Landsberg
notes that an injunction also terminates in individual desegregation litigation when the
plaintiffs cease to be students. Id. at 828. See Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 429-431, 96 S.
Ct. at 2701.
271. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
272. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 815.
273. InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n, 389 U.S. at 74, 88 S. Ct. at 206 ("[An]
abstract conclusion of law [is not] an operative command capable of 'enforcement.' ");
NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435, 61 S. Ct. 693, 699 (1941); Payne
v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897-898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
835, 99 S. Ct. 118 (1978); City of Mishawaka, Indiana v. American Elec. Power Co.,
616 F.2d 976, 991 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, 101 S. Ct. 892 (1981);
Fiss, supra note 9, at 13; Jost, supra note 3, at 1155-1556; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d);
Note, supra note 69, at 1063-1067. Nevertheless, a number of courts have declared school
systems unitary and have then imposed injunctions essentially forbidding a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
274. Note, supra note 240, at 619.
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transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. '275 The declaration of unitariness means that the court has held that the consti-

tutional violation has been remedied: that the desegregation plan has
created a school district in which there is no present discrimination nor

any of the effects or vestiges of past discrimination. In this situation,
accordingly, there is no continuing predicate for federal courts to supplant local control over school affairs; there has been a "substantial
change in law or facts" from the time of the original violation; 276 and
the existing school desegregation injunctions should be dissolved. Since
the violation has been remedied, the authority for the court's outstanding
orders evaporates. 277 Even the consent of the parties cannot extend this
27
authority. 1
The law contemplates that, under appropriate circumstances, per-

manent injunctions will be dissolved since, as a general principle, "an
equitable remedy should be enforced only as long as the equities require
....

'279

This follows the general legal principle that, once an injunction

has achieved its purposes, just as with any other judgment, it should
not be prolonged, for a court's remedial power reaches no furtherand no longer-than the correction of the wrong. As the Supreme Court

275. Brown H, 349 U.S. at 301, 75 S. Ct. at 756; Accord: Raney, 391 U.S. at 449,
88 S. Ct. at 1700; Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S. Ct. at 1694; Council of Emporia, 407
U.S. at 470, 92 S. Ct. at 2207. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct.
706, 735 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, 106 S. Ct. at 1847.
See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 9, at 730-731, 750, 753, 783, 789. But see Terez, supra
note 9; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 839; Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of
Integrated Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 Ohio St. L.J.
117, 126 (1987).
276. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
277. Cf. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248, 51 S. Ct. at 464.
278. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1174 ("[T]he consent decree cannot lie alongside a final
declaration that the school district is unitary."). Further, "[s]ince parties may not confer
jurisdiction upon [the Supreme] Court or the District Court by stipulation, the request
of both parties in this case that the court below adjudicate the merits of the constitutional
claim does not foreclose our inquiry into the existence of an 'actual controversy' within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) and Art. III, § 2, cl.1, of the Constitution.").
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3, 93 S. Ct. 390, 394 n.3 (1972). See Local
Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077 (1986).
279. Note, supra note 69, at 1080. See also Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. MeadowMoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298, 61 S.Ct. 552, 557 (1941) ("The injunction which
we sustain is 'permanent' only for the temporary period for which it may last. ...
Familiar equity procedure assures opportunity for modification or vacating an injunction
when its continuance is no longer warranted."); De Bow, Judicial Regulation of Industry:
An Analysis of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 1987 University of Chicago Legal Forum 353,
357-364. Cf. Dowell III, 677 F.2d at 1504 ("[Ilt is irrational to assume that a school
desegregation plan will be able to serve the needs of the community indefinitely.").
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stated in General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, judicial

power may "extend no farther
than required by the nature and the
'20
extent of [the] violation.
Once unitariness has been declared, school authorities are again
governed by the general equal protection obligation which prohibits
intentional acts of discrimination.28s The school authorities are no longer
subject to the special obligation applied to desegregating districts, which

28 2
requires that conduct must be measured by its effect on integration.
The prohibition on such conduct is an accepted aspect of a school

district's remedial obligation before unitariness is achieved. This obli-

gation ends when unitary status is achieved. As the Court in Council
has been established and
of Emporia stated, "[o]nce the unitary system
2s3
accepted," a different standard applies.
B.

Arguments for Special Obligation

The existence of some sort of special obligation has been defended
by a number of commentators and courts. The ingenuity of these arguments is limited only by the resourcefulness of their proponents: not

280. 458 U.S. at 399, 102 S. Ct. at 3154. See also Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744, 94
S. Ct. at 3126; Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 434, 96 S. Ct. at 2703; Columbus, 443 U.S. at
465, 99 S. Ct. at 2950; Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; Overton, 834 F.2d
at 1176; Landsberg, supra note 3, at 824 'but see Fiss, supra note 27, at 27 ("The
remedial phase in structural litigation is far from episodic. It has a beginning, maybe a
middle, but no end-well, almost no end."); Landsberg, supra note 3, at 839. Cf. Note,
supra note 13, at 224-225.
281. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977) (Arlington Heights);

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979)
(Feeney).
282. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-459, 99 S. Ct. at 2946; Dayton II, 443 U.S. at
537-538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979; Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 462, 92 S. Ct. at 2203;
Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, 91 S. Ct. at 1280; but see Landsberg, supra note 3, at 812-813,
817; Lively, supra note 275, at 119.
283. 407 U.S. at 470, 92 S. Ct. at 2207. See generally Gewirtz, Choice, supra note
9. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 816-817, contends that Swann and Spangler I leave open
whether changing the assignment plan approved in the desegregation order is prohibited
by the affirmative duty to desegregate. Cf. Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 443, 444 n.1, 96 S.
Ct. at 2708 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, there is little benefit to anyone from
forbidding any change in an attendance plan that, as in Riddick, 784 F.2d at 526, and
Dowell I, 606 F. Supp. at 1552, no longer dissolves the racial identification of schools
and absurdly requires black students to be bussed from one predominantly black school
to another. See also Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock Sch. Dist., 705 F.2d 265,
271 (8th Cir. 1983). Further, even assuming arguendo that Landsberg is correct about
Swann and Spangler 1, nevertheless Council of Emporia is not the least bit ambiguous
that the affirmative duty to desegregate itself ends on a finding of unitary status. 407
U.S. at 470. 92 S. Ct. at 2207.
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a substantial restraining force. Many, however, such as that. presented
by Mr. Terez, present only a policy agreement, rather than an argument
even plausibly based on an appeal to the principles and precedents of
general law. Terez, for example, urges a permanent and perpetual injunction to maintain a "unitary system. ' 28 4 Terez justifies this proposal
on grounds that to do otherwise would unfairly deprive a plaintiff of
his hard won injunctive relief. 285 The extent to which this duty of a
school district after it is declared unitary is different from the obligation
of a school district before it is declared unitary is unclear. However,
Mr. Terez argues that somehow there is a difference and that this
difference is "fertile grounds for discussion and debate" .286
Four arguments perhaps illustrate representative themes among those
proponents of a special obligation who do base their contentions on
plausible appeals to general law, precedent, and logic, rather than to
policy.
i.

Neighborhood Schools or Retrogression

Professor Landsberg suggests that the school board continues to
have a special obligation (after the finding of unitariness) not to cause
a condition, e.g., racially imbalanced schools, that resembles conditions
that had been previously found to have been caused by intentional
discrimination. These similar conditions, which he labels "retrogression,"
need not themselves result from intentional discrimination. Landsberg
creatively argues that the purpose of the desegregation decree is not
only to remedy identified constitutional violations but also to "extirpate[]
the overt racial identity of schools" and "to ensure against further
dilatory tactics. ' 28 7 Retrogression, Landsberg argues, restores this overt
racial identity.288 Under this reasoning retrogressive conditions have the
constitutional consequence of "vestiges" or "effects" of segregation and
the dual system.2 89 Thus, Landsberg does not deny that discriminatory
intent is necessary; not quite- he ingeniously allows discriminatory intent
to be shown to have transpired
responsible for post-unitary imbalances
2
before the finding of unitary status. 90

284. Terez, supra note 9, at 60-64.
285. Terez, supra note 9, at 64.
286. Terez, supra note 9, at 64.
287. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 804.
288. See id. at 802.
289. Landsberg notes that this argument was presented to the Fourth Circuit in Riddick,
but was not addressed in haec verba by the court. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 793, 800
n.66. See Dowell II, 795 F.2d at 1522; Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 35-37 (10th
Cir. July 7, 1989). But see Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538-539.
290. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 826. Landsberg posits that, because the "school
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Landsberg bases his argument on Beer v. United States.291 However,
Beer is based on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1975,292 which
is a statutory obligation that does not require proof of intentional
discrimination. 293 Further, the "post-unitary" conditions cannot be the
"vestiges" or "effects" of segregation unless they were caused by "postunitary" intentional discrimination. 294 The "pre-unitary" conditions had
been found by the court to be the result of such intentional discrimination, but these had been corrected. The Supreme Court, in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 211 rejected the contention that a substantial history
of intentional official discriminatory conduct by other than those taking
the action at issue (the defendants or their predecessors in office) has
any bearing on subsequent conduct. 296 Discriminatory intent has to be
"proved in a given case. '297 Further, the Supreme Court has stated that
racial identity of schools alone does not violate the Constitution 29 and
that the sole purpose of a desegregation decree is to remedy constitutional
violations.

299

Eric Schnapper, Assistant Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, has concluded that "such recurrent perpetuation

board is a continuing entity . . .the discriminatory intent may have proceeded the school
system's unitary status." This argues implicitly that intent may be separated from conduct
not only by years but by different composition of the official body. This theory labels
as the "perpetuation of past discrimination" a circumstance that involves no present intent
to perpetuate and no causal connection with any earlier discrimination, but that resembles
an earlier state of affairs that was the result of discrimination. This entirely disregards
the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the need for proof of discriminatory intent. See
Keyes; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976); Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52, 56-57, 84 S. Ct. 603, 605-606 (1964) (election districting);
Akin v. Texas,

325 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). Cf. Note, Selection of Sites for Public
Housing, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 155 (1970).
291. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). Landsberg, supra note 3, at 800-801.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
293. Id. ("and will not have the effect"); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 137,
101 S. Ct. 2224, 2230 (1981); Beer, 425 U.S. at 139-140, 96 S. Ct. at 1362.
294. See Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 435-436, 96 S. Ct. at 2704; Schnapper, supra note
13, at 830. Cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-265, 97 S. Ct. at 562.
295. 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
296. 446 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. at 1503; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539 (History of segregation
"cannot in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not in itself
unlawful.").
297. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74, 100 S. Ct. at 1503.

298. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S.Ct. at 1280 (There is no "substantive constitutional
right [toa] particular degree of racial balance or mixing."); Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 434,
96 S. Ct. at 2703.
299. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 91 S. Ct. at 1276; Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 738, 94 S.
Ct. at 3124; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377-378, 96 S. Ct. at 607; Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 419420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; General Building Contractors, 458 U.S. at 399, 102 S. Ct. at
3154.
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does not violate the Constitution. As long as the present situation is
not the result of any prior intentional discrimination or of any present
discriminatory purpose, the mere resemblance of current harms to some
previous unconstitutionally motivated wrongs is not by itself of more
than historical interest." 3 °° Further, injury must be "ultimately ...
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose" '0 1 and to conduct contem30 2
poraneously motivated by that purpose.
ii.

Dayton II: Oliligation or Presumption

The author of a note in the Harvard Law Review303 grounds his
legal argument-as distinguished from his policy argument-by extrapolating from Keyes and Dayton II. He contends that the shifts of the
burdens of proof announced in Keyes, and purportedly in Dayton II,
are justified as matters of evidentiary law because of the probability
that a school board that has discriminated with respect to a substantial
part of the system, discriminated throughout the system and continues
to discriminate thereafter even after a finding of unitary status. Since
the board better knows its own motivations, it is fairer to require board
members to explain the board's actions (past and present). Policies with
segregative or disproportionate effects must be strictly scrutinized under
any circumstance.3 0 This contention accurately reflects Keyes, but is not
supported by Dayton II or Council of Emporia.05
The Court in Keyes reasoned that if during a specified period of
time the members of a school board have discriminated with respect to
a substantial part of the district, there is no reason to believe that those
same members have not been discriminating with respect to the whole
district during that period of time. 3°0 The Keyes presumption has the
effect of shifting the burden of proof (which is assumed to be a burden

300. Schnapper, supra note 13, at 830, citing Spangler 1,427 U.S. at 434-437. The
two conditions also sometimes referred to as "perpetrations of past discrimination" which
Schnapper considers Fourteenth Amendment violations involve either current discrimination
or unremedied "vestiges" of past discrimination, both clearly remediable. Schnapper, supra
note 13, at 829-831.
301. Washington, 426 U.S. at 240, 96 S. Ct. at 2047.
302. Schnapper, supra note 13, at 834.
303. Note, supra note 9.
304. Note, supra note 9, at 665-670. But see Dayton MI, 443 U.S. at 472-473, 99 S.
Ct. at 2984 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
305. There is a somewhat similar presumption that past intentional discrimination is
the cause of current racial imbalances. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 537, 99 S. Ct. at 2978;
Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 991.
306. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207-208, 93 S. Ct. at 2696.
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of persuasion30 7) to the school board to show that it did not act on the

grounds of race with respect to those other racially unbalanced parts
of the school district.30 s
The Harvard Note seeks to extrapolate this reasoning, attribute it

to Dayton II, and conclude that if the members of a school board have
discriminated in the past, there is no reason to believe that the school
board will not be discriminating in the indefinite future.1 9 However,
that is not an accurate description of Dayton I's holding.
The Dayton II burden is based on the finding "that at the time of

Brown I,310 the defendant was operating a dual school system, that it
was constitutionally required to disestablish that system and its effects,
and that it had failed to discharge this duty .. .. "I" The defendant,
having violated the plaintiff's rights, must redress those violations."a2
This absolute duty of the defendants to desegregate" 3 is qualified only
because a Chancellor can allow these defendant school boards to promote
other important and legitimate governmental goals.3 14 Therefore the school

district has the burden of persuading the court that any action, either
past or proposed, which does not have a desegregative effect is necessary

307. Note, supra note 9, at 653 n.l, 657 n.27; Williams, supra note 13, at 811-813.
But see Rule 301, Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules were adopted effective July 1,
1975, after Keyes was decided. The clear language of the rule governs presumptions such
as those set forth in Keyes. Moreover, as the history of the formulation of Rule 301
suggests, 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-219 (1969); 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (1971); 56 F.R.D. 183, 208
(1972), the Court had accepted previously a "burden of persuasion" view of presumptions
consistent with the language in Keyes. Rule 301, however, now prevails because the federal
evidence rules, an Act of Congress, govern constitutional cases, Lavine v. Milne, 424
U.S. 577, 585, 96 S. Ct. 1010, 1015 (1976). See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct.
at 2977; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 501, 99 S. Ct. at 2958 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
308. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-213, 93 S.Ct. at 2695. Note, supra note 9, at 658-660.
See also Williams, supra note 13, at 812-813.
309. Note, supra note 9, at 660-661; Williams, supra note 13, at 814-815. Cf. Overton,
834 F.2d at 1175.
310. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
311. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534, 99 S. Ct. at 2977.
312. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289, 106 S. Ct. at 1854 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) ("A
violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements does not arise with the making
of a finding; it arises when the wrong is committed."). Cf. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402
U.S. 39, 91 S. Ct. 1287 (1971).
313. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-459, 99 S.Ct. at 2946 (a school district has a "duty
to dismantle its dual system," and "[elach instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this
affirmative duty continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Dayton 11, 443
U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 2978; id. at 542-543, 99 S.Ct. at 2981 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[T]he affirmative duty renders any discussion of segregative intent after 1954 gratuitous.").
314. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 466-469, 92 S. Ct. at 2205; Dayton 11, 443
U.S. at 537-538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979.
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to achieve those other objectives."' This is not accurately described as
.a presumption or shift in the burden of proof or persuasion, because
16 It
it imposes a substantive duty rather than an evidentiary burden.
thus cannot survive the satisfaction of the affirmative duty prescribed
in Dayton 11.
The argument also fails to persuade when evaluated on the basis
of its own logic. It assumes that the intentions-racially discriminatory
or otherwise-of a governmental body do not change over time. While
past conduct may be a guide to future intent of an individual,3 t 7 it is
no guide to the intent of a governmental body, whose membership is
composed of different individuals over time. Further, the argument that
an individual or group of individuals would be just as likely to violate
the law after a finding of such a violation as before such a finding,
contradicts common experience. Most individuals attempt to obey the
law, particularly when they know they are being watched.3"'
This argument is similar to the two claims examined by Judge
Higginbotham that had been advanced in support of such a perpetual
obligation: "First, because a district that has been guilty of purposeful
discrimination is sufficiently likely to return to its bigoted ways, it is
fair to require [that] school district to prove that it is not motivated
by intentional discrimination. Second, the party with superior knowledge
of the facts is better able to prove its intent, and superior access to
proof is a common justification for allocating the burden of proof."3' 9
As Judge Higginbotham notes,
The elements of a violation and who must bear the burden of
their proof are not conceptually distinct from unitary status but
are its components; . . .In the real world of trial and uncertain

proofs, a perpetual placement upon a school board of the burden
of persuading its innocence of conduct with segregative impact
differs little in effect from the superintendence that attends an
extant decree and pending suit .... In short, continuing limits

315. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 467, 92 S. Ct. at 2205; Green v. County Sch.
Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 439, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1694 (1968).
316. If this were merely a presumption, rather than an affirmative duty, it could be
overcome by evidence that the non-integrative effects were the result of conduct demonstrably not motivated by discriminatory intent but by other lawful purposes. See Fed. R.
Evid. 301. Dayton I's mandate is not so easily rebutted. See also Days, supra note 13,
at 1750. But see Chandler, supra note 185, at 533; cf. Devins, supra note 144, at 22,
24.
317. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207, 93 S. Ct. at 2696; Note, supra note 9, at 670 n.94; 2
Wigmore § 302, at 200 (3d ed. 1940).
318. But see Williams, supra note 13, at 812-813.
319. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175. See also Note, supra note 185, at 441, where the
shift in the burden of proof is characterized as "unreasonable."
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imposed as a remedy after the wrong is righted effectively changes
the constitutional measure of the wrong itself; it transposes the
dictates of the remedy for the dictates of the constitution and,
of course, they are not interchangeable. Stated another way, the
constitutional violation is purposeful separation of the races in
public education. The mix that would have occurred but for
the racism is a judicially created hypothetical. We have insisted
upon matching that model of a unitary or desegregated status
as a remedy for the wrong. Refusing, after the match, to allow
a school district to vary from that model unless it proves its
"non-segregative" purpose confuses wrong and remedy.3 20
iii.One or Two Stages of Unitariness
The Eleventh Circuit in Georgia State Conference Branches of NAACP
v. Georgia,3 21suggests that the determination of unitary status must take
place twice, and that the school district retains some sort of special
desegregation obligation until a successful second determination of unitariness. The court stated:
[A] unitary school system is one which has not operated segregated schools as proscribed by cases such as Swann and Green
for a period of several years. A school system which has achieved
unitary status is one which is not only unitary but has eliminated
the vestiges of its prior discrimination and has been adjudicated
as such through the proper judicial procedures ....322
These dicta 23 suggest a tripartite progression of school districts from
"segregated" to "unitary" to "unitary status". The court continues:
"[iut is uncontroverted in this case that the local defendants ceased
operating dual school systems in 1970-71 and, therefore, are unitary in
the sense which permits the use of ability grouping under certain circumstances. "324 This intermediate stage apparently allows conduct having
disparate impact to be used even though such conduct was not permissible
in the first stage. However, until a finding of unitary status has been
made, a school district is under the obligation articulated in Dayton II
not to take any activity which does not further desegregation except

320.

Overton, 834 F.2d at 1176-1177 (footnote omitted).

321. 775 F.2d 1403 (lth Cir. 1985) [Georgia State Conference].
322. 775 F.2d at 1413 n.12.
323. The language here discussed was not necessary to the resolution of the issue
before the court, which ultimately allowed the challenged practice, ability grouping. This
reasoning had not been theretofore considered by the district court, nor was it reviewed
thereafter en banc or on certiorari.
324. 775 F.2d at 1413 (footnote omitted).
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where, after careful consideration of the more desegregative alternatives,
the conduct was necessary to promote legitimate and important governmental objectives.3 25 Once unitary status has been achieved and recognized, the school board may engage in any activity which is not intended
to cause the separation or the different treatment of the races. An
intermediate stage is not only without foundation in any of the decisions
by the Supreme Court,3 26 but also provides no guidance as to which
types of conduct forbidden before a declaration of a "unitary" system
are permissible after such a declaration, but before the achievement of
"unitary status".
Further, Swann and Green proscribe not only the operation of
segregated schools, but also the failure to eliminate the vestiges of prior
discrimination.3 27 A school district cannot operate schools as required
by Swann and Green unless it has eliminated the vestiges of its prior
discrimination. Spangler I accepted that the Pasadena City School system
met the requirements of Swann and Green (at least with respect to
attendance patterns) and had eliminated the vestiges of prior discrimination.3 2 To state that a school district could be a "unitary school
district" under Green and Swann without having eliminated all vestiges
of de jure segregation disregards Green, Swann, and Spangler 1.329
330
In United States v. Lawrence County School District,
the Fifth
Circuit also suggested a two-stage process, or at least two distinct meanings of the term "unitary":
The phrase, the system "is being maintained as a unitary
school district," in our 1974 order ... was following the procedure required by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education ....
The use of the word "unitary"
in the Alexander opinion, like its repetition in the 1974 [Fifth

325. See, e.g., Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 538, 99 S. Ct. at 2979.
326. See generally Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753; Council of Emporia, 407
U.S. at 470, 92 S. Ct. at 2207; Spangler I, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S. Ct. 2697; Dayton I, 433
U.S. 406, 97 S. Ct. 2766; Dayton 11, 443 U.S. 526, 99 S. Ct. 2971.
327. Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4, 88 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4 ("[Tlhe court has not merely
the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.")
(emphasis added); Swann, 402 U.S. at 26, 91 S. Ct. at 1281.

328. Spangler 1, 427 U.S. at 435, 96 S. Ct. at 2705 ("[N]o one contests that [the
desegregation plan's] implementation did 'achieve a system of determining admission to
the public schools on a nonracial basis' "); id. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 2705 ("In this case
the District Court approved a plan designed to obtain racial neutrality in the attendance
of students at Pasadena's public schools. No one disputes that the initial implementation
of this plan accomplished that objective.").
329. See supra text accompanying notes 12-25. See also Gewirtz, Choice, supra note
9, at 793 n.209.
330. 799 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
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Circuit] order, did not imply a judicial determination that the
school system had finally and fully eliminated all vestiges of de
jure segregation. As used in the Supreme Court opinion, the
term referred to the operation of the school system in accordance
with the 1969 order under the aegis of this court. As used in
this court's 1974 order, the word meant no more than that the
system appeared to have been complying with the outstanding
order. It should go without saying that a system does not become
unitary merely upon entry of a court order intended to transform
it into a unitary system.
This passage may suggest that the concept of "unitariness" as used by
the Supreme Court in Alexander was different from that subsequently
used by the Court in Swann and thereafter.33 '
The courts in Georgia State Conference and Lawrence County sought
by this three stage theory to correct a misuse of the term "unitary"
perpetrated by many courts (and possibly the Supreme Court). During
the late 1960's (before Swann), these courts used the term to describe
school districts that had just begun the desegregation process by adopting
constitutionally adequate plans-plans that arguably had not yet been
fully implemented.33 2 These districts were still in the process of desegregating and had not reached the condition of the Pasadena district
discussed in Spangler, foretold in Swann, and required in Green. The
term was used in orders entered sua sponte, by consent, and sometimes
even after hearings.333 The courts had used this term without anyone-

331. "Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is
to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools. Griffin . . . [at] 234 . . . Green . . . [at] 438-439, 442 . . ." Alexander, 396 U.S.
at 20, 90 S. Ct. at 29. But see Swann, 402 U.S. at 31, 91 S. Ct. at 1283; Terez, supra
note 9, at 62 n.90.
Landsberg notes that there are three possible meanings of the label "unitariness." The
first "denotes a school system with only one set of schools, in contradistinction to a dual
system." A second connotes also the "successful[] and ... good faith implement[ation
of] a constitutionally sufficient desegregation plan." The third meaning includes additionally
"that all effects of past discrimination [had] permanently been extirpated." This article
suggests that unitariness requires all these conditions. Landsberg suggests that the term
has no legally correct meaning, and then suggests that the use of the term "unitary" is
"reminiscent" of attempts "to avoid any affirmative duty to promote desegregation."
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 812-813 & n.128.
332. See, e.g., Alexander, 396 U.S. at 21, 90 S. Ct. at 30 ("While each of these
school systems is being operated as a unitary system" the courts may amend the plans
"as may be deemed necessary or desirable for the operation of a unitary system.").
333. The old Fifth Circuit required hearings in Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 448 F.2d 770, 771 (5th Cir. 1971), but this procedure was
apparently not universally followed, nor its omission always appealed.
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bench or bar-realizing that the term recognized a condition with critical
legal consequences.33 4 Obviously, entry of a proper final desegregation

order does not make a district unitary: The order must be fully put
into effect and implemented in order to satisfy the judgment. Mere
approval and preliminary implementation of the plan would not have
been sufficient under either Rule 60(b)(5) or the doctrine of res judicata
to accomplish satisfaction of the judgment. Nevertheless, by the early

1970's (when the decrees involved in Georgia State Conference and
Lawrence County were entered335), this term meant that the school district
had successfully eradicated the dual system and all its vestiges as required
by Green and Swann. Rather than merely admit that some courts had

made an
judgment
live with
"unitary"

unappealed or uncorrected mistake-and either modify that
because of an arguable change in law under Rule 60(b)(5) or
it-the two courts tried to distinguish a determination of
from a determination of "unitary status." This led to the

two decisions and their respective progeny and to the resulting disregard
for Supreme Court precedent.
iv.

Satisfaction or Substantial Change in Circumstance

An argument set out in the Note Unitariness Finding33 6 and by the
Tenth Circuit in Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public
Schools33 7 is based on the position that the dissolution of injunctions is

not necessarily affected by the determination of unitary status and is
granted only on the basis of the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5).335 The
Tenth Circuit stated that the district court may dismiss the litigation
only if it holds that the achievement of unitary status is a " 'substantial

change in law or facts' " from those existing at the time of the initial
violation.3 9 Subsequently, it clarified its disagreement with the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, that, "a finding of unitariness [does not] mandate

334. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 826 and n.177. See Spangler I.
335. Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1413 n.ll (entered 1973 and 1974); Lawrence County, 799 F.2d at 1035 (entered 1974).
336. See supra note 167.
337. 795 F.2d 1516, 1521-1522 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) (Dowell
1); Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 13-19 (10th Cir. July 9, 1989) (opin. withdrawn
Sept. 15, 1989). Cf. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 815; Terez, supra note 9, at 55-56.
338. See supra note 164.
339. 795 F.2d at 1521-1522. The district court found that the desegregation plan "had
achieved its objective." Id. at 1518. Dowell 11 remanded the case to require the district
court to explain fully whether its prior finding of unitariness envisioned changed circumstances sufficient to allow termination of the desegregation plan and dismissal of the case,
Dowell 11, 795 F.2d at 1523. The district court found such a change, Dowell I1, 677 F.
Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla. 1987), which was appealed again. Landsberg, supra note 3, at
815 n.136. The Tenth Circuit again reversed. Dowell IV, No. 88-1067 (10th Cir. July 7,
1989).

1300

0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

the later dissolution of the decree without [additional] proof of a substantial change in the circumstances which led to issuance of that decree. '34
This argument inherently disregards the effect of compliance with
a mandatory injunction under the satisfaction clause of Rule 60(b)(5).
Additionally, even if the satisfaction clause is not applicable, a finding
of unitariness necessarily means that discrimination has ceased and the
unconstitutional dual school system has been dismantled. Circumstances
therefore are critically different from those existing at the time of the
original violation. A finding of unitariness is a finding that "the dangers
prevented by the injunction 'have become attenuated to a shadow." ''3 4'
To the extent that Dowel in 1986 holds that the finding of unitary
status is not sufficient to support the dissolution of the injunction, it
is difficult to determine what event or what finding will in fact "end
judicial superintendence of the schools. 34 2 Under such an interpretation,
Dowell IV conflicts ultimately with Spangler I as well as the long line
of Supreme Court dicta characterizing the desegregation court's supervision as transitional. A transition inherently must have an end, and
Dowell IV fails to provide any realistic standard or hope for such an
3 43
eventuality.
C. Application
In any event, the cases are rather clear. The mandate to dissolve
all injunctions is based on two holdings by the Supreme Court. 34 In
Spangler I, the Supreme Court concluded:
For having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations
on the part of the defendants, the District Court had fully

340.

Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 18 (10th Cir. July 7, 1989); id. at 21, 34-

35.
341. Dowell II, 795 F.2d at 1521. The Tenth Circuit also stated that one factor in
determining whether an injunction should be dissolved is whether continuing the injunction

would be "oppressive." Id. at 1521; Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 14, (10th Cir.
July 7, 1989). This factor is not discussed in Spangler I.
342.

Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175.

343. Dowell H, 795 F.2d at 1520-1521 ("[T]he purpose of the court-ordered school
integration is not to achieve, but also to maintain, a unitary school system.") (emphasis
added); Dowell IV, No. 88-1067, slip op. at 15 (10th Cir. July 7, 1989); Battle v. Anderson,
708 F.2d 1523, 1538 (10th Cir. 1983) (McKay, J.,concurring); Jost, supra note 4, at
1106. See Overton, 834 F.2d at 1176.
344. This mandate is also consistent with "[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an

end to litigation." Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101
S. Ct. 2424, 2429 (1982).
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for
performed its function of providing the appropriate 34remedy
5
previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns.
In Swann, the Supreme Court similarly stated that, once a final judgment
has been implemented and a fully unitary school system has been attained, the role of the Federal courts should end. "[I1n the absence of
a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of
the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns
to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by
346
a district court should not be necessary.
The holdings in Swann and Spangler are consistent with the holdings
of the Supreme Court that stress the temporary nature of a desegregation
decree.347 In Brown 11, the Court noted that the courts would retain
jurisdiction "[d]uring this period of transition" to a "racially nondiscriminatory school system. ' 341 In Green, the Court stated that "the court
should retain jurisdiction [over school desegregation cases] until it 34is9
clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.
Additionally, the "goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated school
system" was not to be achieved in an ultimate but distant millennium;
rather, it was to be "rapidly and finally achieved. ' 350 Finally, the Court
stated in Council of Emporia that "once the unitary system has been
established and accepted" the injunction is lifted. 331 These holdings are
fully consistent with and, indeed, mandated by, the principle that a
remedial plan may extend only as far as necessary to correct the proven
violation. 3 2 In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court stated that a desegregation
"decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed
as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such con-

duct.'

313

345. 427 U.S. at 436-437, 96 S. Ct. at 2705 (emphasis added).
346. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32, 91 S. Ct. at 1283. See Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175;
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 803; cf. Fiss, supra note 9, at 14 ("The Supreme Court was
anxious to emphasize, however, that these specifics were to be viewed as mere expedientsperhaps only of a temporary nature.").
347. But cf. Alexander, 396 U.S. at 21, 90 S. Ct. at 30.
348. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301, 75 S. Ct. at 756.
349. Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694. See Landsberg, supra note 3, at 811.
350. Raney v. Board of Educ. of Gould Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 449, 88 S. Ct.
1697, 1700 (1968).
351. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 470, 92 S. Ct. at 2207.
352. General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399, 102 S.
Ct. 3141, 3154 (1982).
353. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280, 97 S. Ct. at 2757, quoting in part Milliken I, 418
U.S. at 746, 94 S. Ct. at 3128. See also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-294, 96
S. Ct. 1538, 1544 (1976); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744, 94 S. Ct. at 3126.
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A number of lower court decisions governing the effect of a declaration of unitary
status in a desegregation case have applied the fore54
going holdings.
The clearest decision was, again, Spangler v. Pasadena City Board
of Education,3" decided after remand from the Supreme Court's decision
in Spangler . The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district
court on remand had subsequently abused its discretion by refusing to
lift its remedial order in its entirety.31 6 The opinion by Judge Goodwin,
held that "[tihe displacement of local government by a federal court is
presumed to be temporary."35 7 Judge (now Justice) Kennedy's opinion
explicitly required a district court to terminate its remedial orders. Relying
on the Supreme Court's above-quoted directions on remand, Judge
Kennedy concluded that "when a court ordered remedy has accomplished
its purpose, jurisdiction should terminate.""35 According to Kennedy,
"[flurther delay in returning full responsibility for administration to the
school board is unjustified." 35 9
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Riddick supports this
conclusion.360 The district court concluded that the dismissal of the case
had effectively dissolved the injunction and refused to revive or enforce
the desegregation plan. Plaintiffs in Riddick appealed this decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed:
The 1975 order of the district court in Norfolk returned
control of the city's schools to the school board by its finding
that the school system was unitary....
Once a constitutional violation has been remedied, any further judicial action regarding student assignments without a new
showing of discriminatory intent would amount to the setting

354. See also Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., No. C-2-73-248 (S.D. Ohio April
11, 1985), slip op. at 1, cited by Landsberg, supra note 3, at 812 n.124.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (Spangler I1).
Id.
Id.at 1241.
Id.at 1242.
Id.at 1244.
The public schools of Norfolk, Virginia, had been desegregated in the early

seventies pursuant to court order and, in February 1975, the district court entered an
order dismissing the case upon a finding that the district was unitary. Riddick v. School
Bd. of City of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814, 818-819 (E.D. Va. 1984). In 1983, the Board
decided to return to neighborhood schools for elementary students. Black school children
alleged that the Board's decision segregated a substantial percentage of Norfolk's black
elementary school students in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought an
injunction to prevent implementation of the Board's plan. After a hearing, the district
court held that its 1975 order finding the Norfolk school system unitary was "fully
justified," id. at 820, and "should be given full force and effect." Id. at 827.
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of racial quotas, which have been consistently condemned by
the Court in the context of school integration absent a need to
remedy an unlawful condition. Racial quotas are to be used as
a starting point in remedying de jure segregation but not as an
ultimate goal to be continued in perpetuity. Indeed, since almost
every action of a school board with respect to pupil assignments
in a mixed school system necessarily affects racial balance, if
we were to require the Norfolk school board to justify every
action it takes that affects the racial balance of its schools, we
would make a finding that the school system is unitary virtually
meaningless in that context.
The 1975 unitary finding marks the end of de jure segregation in the system. Following such a finding, control of the
system must be allowed to return to local officials.3 6'
Riddick followed dicta in Vaughns v. Board of Education of Prince
3 62
George's County,
where the court recognized that a "district court's
jurisdiction to grant further relief in school desegregation cases is not
perpetual. 3 63 The court further stated, "Once a school system has
achieved unitary status, a court may not order further relief to counteract
resegregation that does not result from the school system's intentionally
discriminatory acts." 364
The First Circuit was equally explicit in Morgan v. Nucci, involving
the Boston, Massachusetts, school system. It noted:
Although the [Supreme] Court has produced no formula for
recognizing a unitary school system, the one thing certain about
unitariness is its consequences: the mandatory devolution of
power to local authorities. Thus, when a court finds that discrimination has been eliminated root and branch from school
operations, it must abdicate its supervisory role, in recognition
that the local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 410 ... (1977).365

361. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538-539 (citations omitted). See also id. at 535 ("But once
the goal of a unitary school system is achieved, the district court's role ends."); School
Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
362. 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985) (Vaughns).

363. Id. at 988.
364. Id. (citations omitted). See also Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 627
F. Supp. at 820. Landsberg suggests that Riddick is flawed because the district court's
order finding unitary status, quoted at Riddick, 784 F.2d 525, and 627 F. Supp. at 818819, never held in haec verba that all vestiges of discrimination had been eradicated.

Landsberg, supra note 3, at 818 n.147. Further, he contends that conduct which perpetuates
the vestiges of segregation need not be shown to have been motivated by intentional
discrimination. Id. This, of course, assumes a de novo review of unitariness.
365. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 1987).
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The First Circuit had earlier held that, under Spangler I, "absent any
showing that school population changes were the result of segregative
actions by the defendants or the result of some other constitutional
violation, the district court's power to decree a remedy had ended when

it implemented its earlier plan.'

'366

As previously recognized, this critical effect of a finding of unitary
status was ably and persuasively defended by the new Fifth Circuit in
Overton. The court discussed the issue in substantial detail. The court
stated "that [a finding of unitary status] must also be accompanied by
a release of a unitary district from the burden of proving that its decisions
are free of segregative purpose. 3 67 Judge Higginbotham held that
"[a]ttaining unitary status .. .means that a school board is free to act
without federal supervision so long as the board does not purposefully
discriminate; only intentional discrimination violates the Constitution.' '368
Speaking for the court, he concluded that the injunction in the Austin,
Texas, school district was properly dissolved and the case closed, for
three equally persuasive reasons, two of which reflect the application
3 69
of principles generally governing school systems throughout the nation.
Relying on the equitable principle that the remedy cannot extend beyond
the nature of the violation,370 the court found that the particular nature
3 71
and function of a declaration of unitary status requires termination.
It additionally rejected the suggestion in Dowell IP 72 that the old Fifth
Circuit in Lee v. Macon County Board of Educationa73 had required74
the court to continue jurisdiction in order to "maintain" desegregation.1
Overton followed a long line of dicta in cases involving desegregation
in the deep South. In United States v. Texas (San FelipeDel-Rio Consol.
Indep. School Dist.),3 75 the old Fifth Circuit noted that: "It has never
been our purpose to keep these cases interminably in the federal courts."
Where a district "has achieved unitary status," then a dismissal is not
out of order. The court elsewhere explicitly contemplated that cause

366. Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 1982).
367. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175.
368. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175 (footnote citing Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
and Washington v. Davis omitted).
369. One of those reasons was that the specific injunction issued in Overton expired
by its own explicit terms. 834 F.2d at 1174.
370. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1176-1177.
371. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1174-1176.
372. Dowell II,795 F.2d at 1520 n.3.
373. 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978).
374. Overton, 834 F.2d at 1174-1176. Cf. Ross v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d
218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1982); Augustus v. School Bd. of Escambia County, 507 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir.
1975).
375. 509 F.2d 192. 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
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' 376
must be shown "why dismissal of the case should be further delayed.
The court in Lawrence County, 77 noted that "[if the court had decided
that the vestiges of segregation had been completely erased, the retention
of jurisdiction would have been anomalous. ' 37 The old Fifth Circuit
made it clear that "[olnce a district achieves unitary status, the methods,
means and procedures employed to reach that status are not frozen and
unchangeable, immunized from the consequences of subsequent racially
neutral attempts to alter or divide the district."37 9 The court noted that
once a finding of unitary status is made "a federal court loses its power
to remedy the lingering vestiges of past discrimination absent a showing
that either the school authorities or the state had deliberately attempted
to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of
3'8 0
the schools.
In Pitts v. Freeman,3"' the Eleventh Circuit stated that "after a
finding of full unitary status" plaintiffs would be required to prove
discriminatory intent 3 2 and that "[u]ntil the DeKalb County School
System achieves unitary status, official action that has the effect of
perpetuating or reestablishing a dual school system violates the defendants' duty to desegregate. ' 3 3 The decision recognized that a finding
of "unitary status .. .requires dismissal of the action. ' ' 3 4 Georgia State
Conference likewise contemplated that the school district's "affirmative
duty to eliminate the consequences of ... [its] prior unconstitutional
conduct" necessarily expires after the hearing needed "[t]o declare a
school district as fully unitary and thus terminate a school desegregation

case.'

'383

376. Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 448 F.2d 770 (5th
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). Accord: Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 594 F.2d
433, 436 (5th Cir. 1979); Pate v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 588 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835, 100 S. Ct. 67 (1979); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.
(Baldwin County), 584 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1978); Augustus, 507 F.2d at 158.
377. 799 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1986).
378.

Id. at 1037.

379. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v.City of Stafford, 594 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1979).
380. United States v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 566 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1007, 99 S. Ct. 622 (1978).
381.

755 F.2d 1423 (lth Cir. 1985).

382. Id.at 1426.
383. Id. at 1427 (emphasis in original). Accord: Georgia State Conference of Branches
of NAACP v. State of Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-1414 (lth Cir. 1985).
384. Id. at 1426. Cf. 755 F.2d at 1427.
385. 775 F.2d 1403, 1414 (lth Cir. 1985). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Board of Educ. of Jackson County, 794 F.2d 1541, 1543 (lth Cir.
1986), is not to the contrary. While granting dissolution, the court opined that unitary
status "does not inevitably require the courts to vacate the orders upon which the parties
have relied in reaching that ... [status]." However, in discussing "premature" terminations
of jurisdiction, "Jackson, on its facts, cannot be construed to invite or command indefinite
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The necessity of requiring proof of subsequent intentional discrimination is supported by Sections 1704 and 1705 of Title 20, adopted by
Congress pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6 Sections
1707 and 1714(c)3 87 further provide that school population changes caused
by demographic shifts do not per se constitute a cause of action for a
new plan of segregation or for modification of a court approved plan.
This means not only that an approved plan cannot be violated by these
demographic shifts, but also that these demographic shifts are not grounds
for new litigation. These provisions would be meaningless if a finding
of prior discrimination in a school district thereafter forever prohibited
neighborhood schools as being a denial of equal protection.3"'
Under the intent standard, a court may not prohibit a unitary
district's change to a neighborhood system merely because that change
may result in racially imbalanced schools. As the Supreme Court found
in Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, adoption of a neighborhood plan may not be enjoined solely because the school district has
some residential segregation, 8 9 and Swann establishes that, absent deliberate discrimination, a federal court may not force upon local school
authorities its view of a preferable degree of racial integration. 39 Many
school districts in this country follow a neighborhood school policy39
and Congress has declared "it to be the policy of the United States

and continued district court involvement to monitor and enforce earlier court orders since
the declaration of unitary status has led to dismissal of the action ....
Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ. (Nunnelley State Technical College), 681 F. Supp. 730, 738 (N.D.
Ala. 1988).
386. Sections 1704 and 1705 of Title 20 of the United States Code provide as follows:
Section 1704. The failure of an educational agency to attain a balance, on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, of students among its schools shall
not constitute a denial of equal education opportunity, or equal protection of
the laws.
Section 1705. Subject to the other provisions of this subchapter, the assignment
by an educational agency of a student to the school nearest his place of residence
which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such
student is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of
the laws unless such assignment is for the purpose of segregating students on
the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, or the school to which such
student is assigned was located on its site for the purpose of segregating students
on such basis.
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 205 and 206, 88
Stat. 515.
387. See supra text accompanying and quoted in note 11.
388. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539.
389. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 533 n.8, 537 n.15, 544, 102 S. Ct.
3211, 3216 n.8, 3217 n.15, 3221 (1982) (Crawford).
390. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 28, 91 S. Ct. at 1276, 1282.
391. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 245-248, 93 S. Ct. at 2715 (Powell, J., concurring).
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school assignments." 3 92 Thus, an intent to promote neighborhood schools

is not an intent to discriminate.3 93
13.

TERMINATION OF JURISDICTION AND SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS

Once the court is persuaded that the school system has attained
unitary status, the court must vacate the judgment, dissolve existing
injunctions, and (where all aspects of the system have achieved unitary
status) ordinarily dismiss the action. Nothing else remains to be done

in this civil action that the court properly may do. Indeed, this is
precisely the analysis contemplated by the Spangler court's directions
on remand, although it did not expressly resolve the question of when
all remedial supervision should be terminated.3 94 The court cannot dismiss
the civil action or terminate jurisdiction if there are supplemental allegations of either discrimination or a threat of discrimination.3 9 The
plaintiff may file supplemental claims or act as if he had filed supplemental claims.396 However, whether the school district is unitary or not,
the burden of proof with respect to supplemental claims is always on

the plaintiff.3 97 Once the supplemental claim is initiated (formally or

392. 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (1982).
393. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 1282. See also Spangler 11, 611 F.2d
at 1245; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 540; Overton, 834 F.2d at 1177-1178; Gewirtz, Choice,
supra note 9, at 793 n.209. But see Note, supra note 185, at 454-455.
394. Note, supra note 13, at 199. Cf. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109
S. Ct. 706, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
395. Obviously, also, where aspects of the system continue to be non-unitary, jurisdiction must be retained. But see United States v. Corinth Municipal Separate Sch. Dist.,
414 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss 1976). Professor Gewirtz suggests that after the dissolution
of injunctions, the "court might retain jurisdiction for a modest period after declaring
unitariness ... to assure that new discrimination does not occur." Gewirtz, Choice, supra
note 9, at 793 n.209. This would be consistent with the Youngblood procedures of the
old Fifth Circuit, Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 448 F.2d
770, 771 (5th Cir. 1971), and with the analysis discussed here.
396. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). See Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified
Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919, 106 S. Ct.
247 (1985). The court has jurisdiction over these claims even if it subsequently determines
that the allegations fail to state a claim of relief. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249, 71 S. Ct. 692, 694 (1951); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

397. There are two burdens on the supplemental determinations. The first one is very
much a formality: as described infra, these determinations are claims for supplemental
relief, and leave to file such claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) must be obtained from
the court. This permission must be granted by the court when justice so requires, and
justice always so requires in desegregation matters. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 226-227, 84 S. Ct. 1226, 1230 (1964). Technically, a formal
motion under Rule 15(d) to file a supplemental pleading should be made. However, failure
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informally), the court must inquire into the merits of such allegations
before dismissing the case.3 9
The first supplemental determination is whether there has been intentional discrimination within the school system that is unrelated to
(or subsequent to) the implementation of the final desegregation plan.3
The Supreme Court noted in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County40 that subsequent discriminatory conduct by the defendants may properly be considered in the pending desegregation suit.4'
This inquiry is also allowed, if not required, under Rule 15(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such discrimination would independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment and merit judicial intervention.4 2 The court must also determine whether there have been additional
vestiges, resulting from these subsequent intentional discriminatory acts,
that must be eliminated. 403

to do so does not impair the ability of the court to grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
Thereafter, a substantially greater burden is on the plaintiff to show the existence of
deliberate racial discrimination or the imminent threat of the same. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). This burden of persuasion on the supplemental
claims is equivalent to that in an independent civil action.
398. Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 682 F.2d 894, 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
399. Swann, 402 U.S. at 32, 91 S. Ct. at 1284 ("[Ifn the absence of a showing that
either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted
to fix or alter the demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools").
Obviously, discriminatory conduct related to the desegregation plan affects the district's
progress toward unitary status. Conceivably, isolated occurrences of discriminatory conduct-e.g., in faculty employment-may not necessarily constitute a failure to implement
the plan nor thus affect the district's unitariness. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9,
99 S. Ct. at 2978 n. 9; Spangler I, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S. Ct. at 2704. However, the
Keyes presumption may assist in proving such a failure to implement the plan.
400. 377 U.S. 218, 84 S. Ct. 1226 (1964).
401. The Court in Griffin said:
.The original complaint had challenged racial segregation in [public] schools. ...
The new complaint charged that ... [the] County was still using its funds,
along with state funds, to assist private schools while at the same time closing
down the county's public schools, all to avoid the desegregation ordered in the
Brown cases. The [supplemental] complaint thus was not a new cause of action
but merely part of the same old cause of action arising out of the continued
desire of colored students . . . to have the same opportunity for state-supported
education afforded to white people . . . . Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules . . .
plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening after suit,
and it follows, of course, that persons participating in these new events may
be added if necessary. Such amendments are well within the basic aim of the
rules to make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair administration
of justice.
Id. at 226-227 (footnote omitted).
402. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
403. Swann, 402 U.S. at 32, 91 S. Ct. at 1284.
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The second supplemental determination is whether there is an imminent and immediate threat of future intentional discriminatory conduct. This determination is consistent with the mandate that the district
court assure that desegregation not recur.
This future discriminatory
conduct may be related to the desegregation plan, but the threat must
40 5

be one of intentional discrimination.
14.

PRECLUSION

Where a court holds a school district to be unitary, the findings
necessarily supporting this final judgment, like all other findings in the
litigation, become res judicata as to the case. 40 6 A finding of unitary
status constitutes a finding that the constitutional violations alleged and
proved as the predicate for the remedial plan have been corrected. The
issues of liability, remedy, and the satisfaction of the remedy may not
be further litigated on the same claim for relief.40 7 Additionally, under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this finding also precludes the relitigation of these issues in subsequent actions between the same parties
and their privies.408

404. Id. at 21, 91 S. Ct. at 1278.
405. Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 413, 417, 97 S. Ct. at 2772, 2774; Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
99 S. Ct. 2282; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S. Ct. at 563; Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047 (1976); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198, 93 S.
Ct. at 2692. An expressed preference for neighborhood schools is insufficient evidence
upon which to base a finding of such a threat. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 543, 102 S. Ct.
at 3220; Spangler 1I, 611 F.2d at 1244-1247.
406. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 529-532. Dowell 11, 795 F.2d at 1522 ("When, five years
later, the court determined that the implementation of the Finger plan had resulted in
unitariness within the district, that finding became final, and it, too, is binding on the
parties with equal force ....
Thus ... the trial court properly refused to permit the
plaintiffs to relitigate conditions extant [at the time of the declaration of unitariness].").
407. IB Moore's Federal Practice,
0.405 to 0.415, at 178-512.
408. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 873, 104 S. Ct.
2794, 2798 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980); Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 n.5 (1979); Lawlor v.
National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326, 75 S. Ct. 865, 867 (1955); IB Moore's,
0.405[1], at 178-181, 190-196. This preclusion is often also referred to as res judicata,
but Moore's distinguishes it and calls it collateral estoppel. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.
127, 138 n.10, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2212 n.10 (1979). See generally, IB Moore's Federal
Practice
0.444[3]. See also United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 73
S. Ct. 807 (1953).
Consent orders in compromise and settlement of a suit have no effect on subsequent
litigation but do have preclusive effect within the litigation. However, if the decree was
entered "after the court made findings on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for relief,
the order is not a consent order in settlement of the suit but is an order on the merits
of the same. The fact that the parties agreed to the order does not alter that conclusion."
Riddick, 784 F.2d at 530; International Building Co., 345 U.S. at 506, 73 S. Ct. at 809.
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The doctrine of res judicata itself is the foundation for the principles
of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion. This doctrine is summarized
with respect to the general principles of issue preclusion in Montana v.
United States:4
A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata, is that a "right, question or fact distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies . . . ." Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United
States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897). Under res judicata, a final
judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their
privies based on the same cause of action. Under collateral
estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined
... that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based
on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior
litigation.
A.

Identity of Issues

410
In ascertaining whether subsequent school desegregation litigation
is precluded by a prior judgment, the claim must first be examined.
The scope of the issues governed by res judicata is far broader than
the issues governed by collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, all issues
that were or could have been litigated are governed by the first adjudication. 41 Those issues must arise in litigation brought under the same
"cause of action." Under the Restatement of Judgments, this includes
claims arising from the same "transaction. ' 41 2 The establishment and
continuation of a dual system of schools would appear to meet this
standard.

But see Jost, supra note 3, at 1103 ("Relatively few complex injunctions wholly lack an

element of consent."); id. at 1146 ("If a desegregation decree turns out to be totally
ineffective in eliminating segregation, the fact that the decree was entered by consent

should not preclude the beneficiary from claiming a continued, enforceable right to attend
schools free from illegal segregation." This is an "inalienable entitlement [lthat ultimately
cannot be contracted away.") (footnote omitted).
409. 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973 (1979) (citations omitted).
410. Collateral estoppel applies to school desegregation litigation. Riddick, 784 F.2d
at 531; Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d 731; Bronson, 687 F.2d 836.
411. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877); United States v. Nevada, 463
U.S. 110, 129-130, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2917 (1983).
412. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 comment b (1982). United States v.
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130 n.12, 103 S. Ct. at 2918 n.12. But see Lawlor v. National
Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 327-328, 75 S. Ct. 865, 868 (1955).
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However, under collateral estoppel "[a] judgment is not conclusive
in a subsequent action as to issues which might have been but were
not litigated and determined in the prior action. ' 41 3 Where the current
action relies on the discriminatory conduct addressed by the prior suit
the issues are necessarily the same. A suit seeking a remedy for the
same discriminatory conduct is thus an action on the same claim for
relief. 414 On the other hand, new segregatory conduct, motivated by
contemporaneous discriminatory intent, is not affected by the previous
finding of unitary status."'
Landsberg objects to the application of collateral estoppel to desegregation remedies on grounds that "the parties do not typically litigate

the question of whether particular aspects of the plan are tailored to
the violation" and that the "effects of the past unlawful practices are
not addressed. ' 41 6 Landsberg further suggests that a busing order will
not necessarily be based on findings that it was necessary. 4 7 This objection assumes not only that the courts have customarily disregarded
their desegregation duties as prescribed by numerous Supreme Court
directives, but also that the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that
all issues must be explicitly discussed, that a claim based on discriminatory school assignment can properly be broken into a multitude of
discrete "issues" and "injuries," each of which may be separately
litigated and remedied, and that no issues can be included as decided
by necessary implication or as part of the whole. 418 Once a system has
been found segregated as a whole, whether by operation of the Keyes
presumption or not, the remedy must address all aspects of the dual
system and all "injuries" caused by that segregation. Where there was

413. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment e (1982); Landsberg, supra
note 3, at 825. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 874, 104 S. Ct. at 2798; Lawlor, 349 U.S. at
326, 75 S. Ct. at 867; Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-95, 101 S. Ct. at 414.
414. Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d 731. See Miller v. Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 946,
948 (10th Cir. 1982); Note, supra note 104, at 525-527. Cf. Migra v. Warren City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85, 104 S. Ct. 892, 897 (1984). See generally, Allen,
449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411.
415. Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d at 739-741. See Landsberg, supra note 3, at 826.
416. See Landsberg, supra note 3, at 810. See id. at 826-827. See also Jost, supra
note 3, at 1103, 1131. See Fiss, supra note 27, at 47-49.
417. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 826-27. Landsberg suggests that the failure of the
court to specify that a condition is a vestige of segregation, and is being remedied by
the desegregation plan, Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 417-418, 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2774, 2775,
permits a subsequent plaintiff to use this vestige as a predicate for further remedies.
Landsberg, supra note 3, at 818-821.
418. Cf. Spangler II, 611 F.2d at 1242; EEOC v. International Longshoremens Ass'n,
623 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1980). For the purposes of preclusion, the Restatement
(Second) Judgments includes within such a claim all rights arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(a) (1982).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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a systematic remedy for systematic segregation, all forms of discrimination and segregatory conduct within the school system attributable to
the school authorities or other state officials, and all vestiges and effects
of that conduct, must be deemed remedied by a desegregation plan
finally approved as constitutionally adequate. 1 9
B.

Privity of Parties

A second aspect of the application of collateral estoppel is the
determination of parties in privity to the original litigants.4 20 Where the
complaining parties are different, the resolution of the question becomes
in many respects dispositive. 42' The concept of the privity of the parties
appears to be the same for the application of both res judicata and
collateral estoppel. A party bound under res judicata is bound under
collateral estoppel. 422 Where the named plaintiffs are identical-a rare
occurrence in protracted school desegregation litigation 423-the issue resolves itself. Where the previous action was a duly certified class action,
this takes on a complexity of some magnitude. 424 It must be determined

whether the classes represented in the two suits may be "in sufficient
'425

privity for the principles of collateral estoppel .. .to apply.
Under the definition of the class made pursuant to Rule 23(e), the

current plaintiffs-or a large part of them and the class they representmay be part of the previous class, particularly if the class had been
defined to include future students.4

26

However, as noted by Landsberg,

427
no class definition may ever have been made in the previous litigation.
However, the previous action may have been treated as a class action,
4 2

even if no explicit determination and no class allegations were made.

1

419. See Dayton I,433 U.S. at 420, 97 S. Ct. at 2775; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213, 93
S. Ct. at 2699; United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 869 (5th
Cir. 1966).
420. Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d at 741-742. See Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464
U.S. 900, 902, 104 S. Ct. 255, 256 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
421. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 & n.2 (1989).
422. See Dowell 1,606 F. Supp. at 1555. Cf. Moore's Federal Practice 0.44113.-1],
at 731.
423. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 532.
424. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 807-808. But cf. id. at 828.
425. Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of Akron Public Sch., 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982); Bronson,
525 F.2d at 349; Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d 731.
426. Dowell I,606 F. Supp. at 1555.
427. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 808.
428. Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 686 F.2d 1135, 1139-1140 (5th Cir. 1982)
("despite the lack of a formal order certifying this case as a class suit, this case was in
fact a class action and was specifically described and treated as such by the parties and
the trial court."); Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d at 741 n.11; but see Jackson v. Hayakawa,
605 F.2d 1121, 1125-1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1979).
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On the other hand, failure to obtain certification may also transform
4 29
a pre-1966 class action into a post-1966 individual action.
Privity may include a party-including the United States Government-who "had .. .totally financed and controlled" the efforts of a
named party to the previous litigation.4 0 Some circuit courts have suggested an additional form of privity. Where the current plaintiffs were
"virtually represented" by a previous class action, they are bound by
the previous judgment. 43 "The application of this doctrine [of virtual
representation] to desegregation cases is particularly appropriate. It has
been recognized that unless subsequent generations of school children
are bound by preclusion rules from relitigating identical claims of un'43 2
lawful segregation, those claims would assume immortality.
However, if the current plaintiffs are not in privity with the previous
plaintiffs, they are not precluded from relitigating the issue of the
sufficiency of desegregation remedy. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare
decisis would apply in its strongest sense.
The decisions in Riddick support this principle.4 33 The court noted:
Once a court decides an issue of law or fact necessary to its
judgment, that decision can be binding upon a party to it if
the party was given a "full and fair opportunity to litigate [the]
issue in the earlier case."
While the actual make-up of class members may be different
because of the passage of time (as it is bound to have been at
the beginning and ending of Beckett), we believe that the two
classes are in sufficient privity for the principles of collateral
434
estoppel or issue preclusion to apply.

429. Landsberg, supra note 3, at 808; see Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d
923, 925, 936 n.16 (5th Cir. 1984). See also dissent, id. at 943. But see United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 371 F.2d 836, 865 n.62 (5th Cir. 1966); Dowell 1, 606
F. Supp. at 1555; Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979);
Note, supra note 95, at 525-527.
430. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. at 2184 n.2; Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159 n.5, 104 S.
Ct. at 572 n.5; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 155, 99 S.Ct. at 974. See Nevada
v. United States, 463 U.S. at 134-144, 103 S. Ct. at 2920. But see Kania v. Fordham,
702 F.2d 475, 476 n.2 (4th Cir. 1982).
431. Los Angeles Branch, 750 F.2d at 741 (applying and approving California law).
432. Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1982); but see Spangler I,
427 U.S. at 429-430, 92 S. Ct. at 2701.
433. Adams v. School Dist. No. 5, Orangeburg Co., S.C., 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912, 92 S. Ct. 230 (1971), later app., School Bd. of the City of
Norfolk v. Brewer, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 1778
(1972). See Riddick v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 938, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
434. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 531, 532.
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CONCLUSION

The dismantling of dual, segregated, school systems is what desegregation is all about. Bright lines and deadlines help focus the mind on
achieving that end with more than deliberate speed. Unitary status, not
indefinite judicial supervision, is the end for which all parties should
be striving. A prolonged denial of local control will, in the long run,
serve no one. 35' Local accountability is essential if a school system is
to succeed in its mission of educating children of all races; prolonged
judicial control destroys that accountability. The Court in Brown v.
Board of Education436 was wary that requiring too much too soon might
cause states and local school boards to balk, and so the Court settled
for desegregation with "all deliberate speed. ' ' 437 But times have changed.
Now the failure to demand that unitariness be achieved quickly not only
disserves minority students but also diminishes local control. The two
goals of any desegregation process should be thus succinctly stated:
dismantle dual school systems as quickly as possible, and-when this is
done-end federal intervention.
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The benefit suggested by some that school boards still in the process of desegmight claim financial assistance for that process from state governments, appears
weak attempt to delay the goal of the desegregation process.
Brown H, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753.
Id. at 301, 75 S. Ct. at 756.

